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ABSTRACT 
Computer security is a growing field in the IT industry. One of the important 
aspects of the computer security is authentication. Using passwords (something 
you know) is one of the most common ways of authentications. But passwords 
have proven to provide weak level of security as they can be easily compromised. 
Some other ways of authenticating a user are using physical tokens, (something 
you possess) and biometrics, (something you are). Using any one of these 
techniques to secure a system always has its own set of threats. One way to make 
sure a system is secure is to use multiple factors to authenticate. One of the ways 
to use multiple factors is to use all the three factors of authentication, something 
you possess, something you are and something you know. This thesis discusses 
about different ways of authentication and implements a system using three 
factor authentication. It takes many security aspects of the system into 
consideration while implementing it, to make it secure. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
As the computer technology is prevailing, the security related problems with 
computers are also increasing. The purpose of computer security is to protect an 
organization's valuable resources, such as information, hardware, and software. 
To know if a person is right user, we need to authenticate the person. The goal of 
authentication is to identify a person directly or indirectly.  
This thesis implements one of the best ways of authenticating a person taking 
many issues into consideration. The structure of this thesis is organized as 
follows.  
Chapter 2 provides security background and different kinds of authentications. It 
introduces different ways of authentications and also discusses how multiple 
factors can be used for authentication. 
Chapter 3 introduces Java Ring, and iButton. It discusses different functions the 
iButton provides and also focuses on how secure an iButton is. It details the Java 
Card technology and its functionality in an iButton. It discusses about smart card 
technology and open card framework. It also explains as to how the 
communication takes place between a Java Card and an Open Card. 
Chapter 4 describes the different biometrics and how fingerprints are better than 
other biometrics. It discusses the fingerprint API used in the implementation. 
Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of the system using three-factor 
authentication. 
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Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the security aspects of the system 
implementation. 
Chapter 7 discusses the future work that can be done with the system. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
COMPUTER SECURITY 
Computer security has become a prevalent concern from the dawn of the 
Internet and before. Network breaches and e-commerce fraud are increasing 
rapidly, as reported in the Computer Security Institute -2001 Computer Crime 
and Security Survey [7]. Today 85% of large corporations and government 
agencies acknowledge network security breaches. Of these organizations, 64% 
acknowledge financial losses that run into millions of dollars due to network 
breaches and e-commerce fraud [7]. 
 Security is about well-being (integrity) and about protecting property or interests 
from intrusion, stealing or wire-tapping (privacy) [1]. The purpose of computer 
security is to protect an organization's valuable resources, such as information, 
hardware, and software. Examples include remote access to computer accounts, 
access to web sites, and bank account access at automated teller machines. 
Through the selection and application of appropriate safeguards, security helps 
the organization's mission by protecting its physical and financial resources, 
reputation, legal position, employees, and other tangible and intangible assets. To 
grant access to a few, we need to know whom we can trust and we need to verify 
the credentials (authenticate) of those who come near us. 
Security is thus based on the following independent issues [1]:  
• Privacy - the ability to keep things private/confidential  
• Trust - do we trust data from an individual or a host? Could they be used 
against us?  
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• Authenticity - are security credentials in order? Are we talking to whom 
we think we are talking to, privately or not?  
• Integrity - has the system been compromised/altered already? 
Information security is a necessary underpinning for further advances in 
electronic business. Technologies such as session encryption, firewalls, virtual 
private networks, wireless LANs, and digital certificates have all emerged as 
pieces of the solution. While each is designed to enhance some aspect of 
information security — whether by restricting access to or preventing the 
interception of private data — none of them alone is designed to address the 
fundamental security issue that underlies the most damaging information crimes 
such as “is the person who is attempting to access protected files or resources an 
authentic user or an impostor?” To know this we need to authenticate the user. 
2.1. Authentication: 
The goal of authentication is to identify a user either directly or indirectly. There 
are many possible ways of authentication available. Some of them are passwords, 
host-based authentication, physical tokens and biometrics. 
2.1.1. Passwords:  
Using password is one of the ways of restricting access to documents where the 
server administrator needs to be able to control access on an individual basis. 
This is called user authentication and requires a user name and password before 
being allowed to access a document. Setting up a User authentication takes two 
steps, first creating a file name containing the usernames and passwords. 
Secondly, telling the server what resources are to be protected and which users 
are allowed (after entering a valid password) to access them. 
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2.1.2. Host-Based Authentication: 
Host based authentication is situation where authentication takes place based on 
the host information, rather than the more usual method of prompting for a 
password. This is very convenient if a non-interactive process is trying to 
authenticate with a remote machine. SSH relies on such authentications and uses 
public and private key pairs to establish a secure connection.  
2.1.3. Physical Tokens: 
Physical Token includes physical devices that are used to compute the credentials 
presented to the verifier as well as software files that must be possessed by the 
claimant in order to compute the credentials.  Examples of physical devices 
include smart cards, magnetic stripe cards and one-time password generators.  
Software files will typically contain secret or private keys that are used to compute 
credentials; however physical devices may contain these keys as well.  These 
physical devices are sometimes called authentication tokens or dongles. 
2.1.4. Biometrics: 
Biometrics includes something inherent to a person. In this category, human 
physical characteristics such as fingerprints, facial features, heat signature of head, 
retinal scans, handwriting or voice are used to produce the credentials. There are 
many biometric devices available. An example of biometric is the car Lexus 430s 
model 2004 which uses a fingerprint recognition system to identify its owner. The 
owner’s fingerprint is scanned when he opens the door handle which uses 
fingerprint recognition technology to authenticate [3]. 
No matter what kind of authentication we use, it is impossible to have a 
completely secure system. But we can make it as hard as possible for the person 
trying to breach. 
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Today, the most common form of authentication is password control. In general, 
technologies for authenticating a potential user of an information system are 
organized into three identification factors: something you know, something you 
have, and something you are. An example of something you know is a password 
or a personal identification number (PIN), something you have is a physical token 
such as a smart card and something you are is a biometric such as a fingerprint. 
An application can use either one of these authentication techniques or a 
combination of two or more of these techniques.  However, each of these factors 
is vulnerable to attack if used alone or in pairs. Highly secure systems can use 
multiple factors to secure their systems. We will next discuss about one factor, 
two factor and three factor authentications. 
2.2. One Factor Authentication: 
One factor authentication relies on one of the above three factors for 
authentication. Using a password is one of the most common one factor 
authentication used. Unfortunately, passwords can be easily misapplied and 
provide a weak level of security. One reason is that users tend to pick simple 
passwords that are easy to remember. Some of the ways passwords can be 
compromised are as follows. 
• If a dictionary word is used as a password, it is a fairly quick and easy 
task for a computer program to try every English word and guess the 
password. Policies for ensuring secure passwords result in greater 
inconvenience for users, in turn causing users to write down the 
passwords or use passwords that can be easily memorized. In addition, 
typical users use the same password for multiple accounts, further 
degrading security.  
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• Keystroke Monitoring is monitoring and storing every keystroke a 
person makes on keyboard. Using special software, passwords are easily 
lifted, leading to a potential security compromise. In more extreme 
situations, a monitor’s emissions can be read and deciphered, revealing 
everything displayed on the screen [8]. 
• Password cracking tools such as brute force that allow an attacker to 
automate the process of guessing user passwords are readily available for 
download from the Internet, making it relatively easy to crack the average 
password. This type of security breach is a result of repeated login 
attempts with different key combinations or words. 
• Furthermore, many successful attacks are accomplished using passwords 
obtained from social engineering (an attacker’s use of clever 
manipulation to trick trusting users into divulging password information), 
a problem that even the best of corporate password policies find difficult 
to address[6]. 
• Using Man-in-the-Middle Attack, a computer is set up as an interface 
between a client computer and the server that handles authentication. 
The computer in the middle accepts the client’s password as if it were the 
server and logs in to the server using the client’s identity.  
• Network Monitoring, also known as sniffing, occurs when a computer 
on a network looks for message streams that contain words such as 
“password” or “login.” This is especially common in Ethernet networks 
where every computer on the network can easily read any network traffic. 
Streams containing passwords can be stored and used to gain 
unauthorized access [8]. 
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Password security mechanisms can be strengthened further through the use of 
“one-time passwords.” One-time passwords can be implemented through either 
software or hardware. But one One-time passwords have their own set of 
complications. User error is a common problem with password generators 
because users must manually enter each password during the authentication 
process. This can be cumbersome when repeated many times and can increase 
the likelihood of repeated errors. Session-based authentication is vulnerable to 
‘session hijacking’ because the end-user is able to leave the computer unattended 
while the authenticated session is still active. In addition back-end management of 
password generation environments is time consuming and costly as databases and 
servers must be retooled to accommodate the changing password requirements 
[8]. 
2.3. Two factor Authentication:   
When two factors are used to authenticate, it is called two factor authentication. 
The two factors involved may be any two of three methods: passwords, physical 
tokens or biometrics. Two factor authentications are better than one factor 
authentication because, if passwords are the only ones used, there is a probability 
for the password to be compromised. Passwords with physical tokens such as a 
smart card can be used for two factor authentication. This type of authentication 
is resistant to single-factor attacks including keystroke monitoring, social 
engineering, man-in-the-middle attacks, network monitoring, and password 
cracking. One example in daily use is the Bank application where the user is 
prompted to enter his card after which he is prompted for a pin.  
Many applications use a smart card with a password. To authenticate to an 
information system or network, the user will insert his/her smart card into a 
hardware reader connected to a workstation or laptop computer. The processor 
on the smart card will encrypt a text string with the user’s private key and the 
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authentication server decrypts using the public key. In this approach, the user’s 
private key never has to be communicated outside of the smart card and never 
leaves the smart card’s circuitry. This helps preserve the integrity of the private 
key.  
Systems using this form of two-factor authentication are vulnerable to attacks 
through theft of the hardware token coupled with the use of password 
compromise techniques mentioned above. 
An example of a product which uses two factor authentication and goes beyond a 
simple static password is DataCard. Datacard's Two-Factor Authentication is 
designed to curb network and e-commerce abuse [7]. 
2.4. Three factor Authentication: 
Three factor authentication systems relies on three factors for authentication: 
something you know such as password, something you possesses such as a 
physical token, something you are, a biometric characteristics. Using a 
combination of all three makes the security system stronger. Biometrics is one of 
the most reliable and most widely used forms of authentication these days. 
Having three factors makes it difficult to cheat a system, thus strengthening the 
security. There are many companies and software products that use three factor 
authentication. Some companies and software products in today’s market which 
use three factor authentication are given below along with the factors each use for 
three factor authentication. 
 Fortress Technologies, the market leader in securing wireless LANs, uses 
three-factor authentication, a pioneering approach to multi-tiered network 
authentication for wireless enterprises [4]. The three-factor approach, unique to 
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Fortress AirFortress wireless security gateway, has three layer of authentication, 
Network Authentication, Device Authentication and User Authentication.  
Dekart Logon, a software program designed to add the strong authentication 
and convenience to the standard Windows logon procedure allows to access 
Windows driven computers and domains in an easy, fast and secure way by using 
different types of hardware keys. The login and password of the user are entered 
automatically once the hardware key is connected to the computer. Users gain the 
flexibility to select from different smart cards, hardware tokens, as well as USB 
flash drives and other types of removable media to provide fast and convenient 
two- or three-factor authentication within their Windows environment [5]. 
Lock-Out 2000 Biometric Authentication Edition is a combination of 
Biometric Middleware and Authentication Middleware.  The core module of 
Lock-Out 2000 Biometric Authentication Middleware is designed to 
engage three-factor's of authentication access. The security administrator of the 
workstation assigns a unique wearable Java-powered iButton to the user and then 
assigns a PIN number for (two-factor) authentication, similar to any bank ATM 
machine. The administration utility tool then acts as the Biometrics enrollment 
station, whereby the users look straight into a camera and is enrolled in less 
than 20 seconds with 11 default pictures.  This authentication assures a 90-100% 
verification results. 
TRIO VAULT™ combines 3-factor user authentication, a single-sign-on 
solution, and access management into a single, integrated Palm OS® application 
that interfaces seamlessly with the existing network security infrastructure and 
eliminates the need for authentication and single-sign-on servers. TRIO 
VAULT™ requires users to authenticate themselves to a PDA using all three 
factors of authentication. The PDA then authenticates the user to the service user 
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wants. Because the PDA manages the creation and use of passwords for each 
account, users no longer have a need to remember passwords for individual 
accounts [6]. 
This Thesis implements an application with Three factor authentication using 
passwords, a Java Ring (a physical token) and fingerprint recognition (biometric). 
The next chapter gives an introduction to the Java Ring and discusses the security 
issues of a Java Ring and the communication in a Java Ring.  
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C h a p t e r  3  
JAVA RING 
3.1. Introduction to JavaRing: 
A Java Ring is a wearable finger ring that contains a small microprocessor. The 
Java Ring is an extremely secure Java-powered electronic token with a 
continuously running, unalterable real time clock. The rugged packaging of the 
Java Ring makes it suitable for many applications. The jewel of the Java Ring is 
the Java iButton. 
 
Figure 3.1 Java Ring 
The Java Rings made their appearance at 1998 Java One Conference. 
The iButton is a one-million transistor; single-chip trusted microcomputer with a 
powerful Java virtual machine (JVM) housed in a rugged and secure stainless-steel 
case [9].  
 
Figure 3.2: iButton 
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When coming to secure internet transactions, the two most fundamental 
problems with internet transactions involving sensitive information are 
authentication and secure transmission of the data. By eavesdropping, someone 
can gain information about a person and steal his identity. The iButton provides 
for secure end-to-end internet transactions–including granting conditional access 
to Web pages, signing documents, encrypting sensitive files, securing email and 
conducting financial transactions safely - even if the client computer, software 
and communication links are not trustworthy. When PC software and hardware 
are hacked, information remains safe in the physically secure iButton chip. The 
ibutton connects to computers with a Blue Dot receptor [10]. 
 
Figure 3.3: Blue Dot Receptor 
These are some of the functions that can be done by simply pressing the Blue 
Dot with the iButton:  
• Granting access privileges to sensitive information on a conditionally 
accessed Web page using PKI challenges/response authentication. 
• Signing documents so the recipient can be certain of their origin. For 
example, you can write and sign an expense report. Or you can author a 
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newspaper story, sign it at your vacation home and email it to the 
publisher.  
• Encrypt and decrypt messages, securing email for the intended eyes only.  
• Conduct hassle-free monetary transactions–print your own electronic 
postage stamps or prints, write, and sign your own electronic checks [10]. 
3.2. iButton: 
The iButton is a self-powered computer chip with networking serial number 
housed in a 16mm stainless steel can.  
 
Figure 3.4: Self-powered computer chip in an 
iButton 
The iButton form factor has a computer chip with a unique way of 
communication by touch contact of the button to a variety of read/write devices. 
iButton makes many capabilities which are limited to a stationary or hard-wired 
computer, portable and universally available. Among these capabilities are user-
accessible memory, timekeeping, temperature measurement or logging, and 
encryption computation.  
It has the ability to perform large integer modular exponentiations at high speed 
which is central to RSA encryption, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Digital 
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Signature Standard (FIPS 186), and many other modern cryptographic 
operations. 
Each iButton has a unique 8-byte serial number and guarantees that no two serial 
numbers are the same. Each iButton can be easily used in a network with its serial 
number as an address for Internet connection.  
As mentioned earlier, an iButton communicates with a processor by a simple 
touch to a 1-Wire interface called a Blue Dot Receptor. The iButton is ideal for 
applications where information needs to travel with a person or object. Some 
iButtons are memory devices that can hold files and subdirectories and can be 
read and written like small floppy disks. There are iButtons with password-
protected capabilities for a file for security applications where the iButtons counts 
the number of times the files have been rewritten for securing financial 
transactions, point-of-sale transactions, remote access authorization, data logging 
(including time and temperature), maintenance and quality control.  
Java Ring with the iButton can be carried around as an accessory for many 
reasons. Passwords are difficult to keep as a secret. They can be stolen. Short 
passwords are easy to guess where as long passwords are difficult to remember 
and tend to be written down. There are many password breaking tools available 
such as brute force, scanning word lists and using patterns. Many network 
applications transmit passwords clear over the network. 
Java Ring with the iButton can overcome the deficiencies of the secret passwords. 
It can be used to store the secret passwords and private keys needed to conduct a 
transaction. Using the iButton, the keystrokes can be eliminated with a quick, 
intentional press of the Blue Dot.  
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The receptor has an adapter that connects to the computer's serial, parallel, or 
USB port. Communication is established when an iButton is touched to the Blue 
Dot receptor. The iButton draws the power it requires to operate from the 
connection. When not in contact with a receptor, the state of the Java virtual 
machine and memory is maintained with lithium backup power. 
Java iButton is Java Card 2.0 compliant. Java iButton, can be used to write applets 
that can be compiled with the standard tools available from Sun Microsystems. 
These applets can be loaded into the Java iButton, and run on demand to support 
a wide variety of financial applications. The Java Card 2.0 specification provides 
the opportunity to implement a useful version of the JVM and runtime 
environment with the limited resources available to a small processor. Java Card 
and its related topics are discussed in chapter 3. 
3.2.1. How secure is iButton: 
The National Institute of Standards (NIST) and the Communications security 
Establishment (CSE) have validated a version of the crypto iButton for 
protection of sensitive, unclassified information. FIPS 140-2 validation assures 
government agencies that the products provide a trusted, physically secure 
module to properly protect secure information [10]. 
The stainless steel case of the device provides clear visual evidence of tampering 
thus providing extraordinary security. The monolithic chip includes up to 134K 
of SRAM that is specially designed so that it will rapidly erase its contents as a 
tamper response to an intrusion [10]. Rapid erasing of the SRAM memory is 
known as zeroization. When an iButton detects any intrusion, it erases its private 
keys leading to zeroization. Any attempt to uncover the private keys within the 
SRAM made by an attacker are thwarted because the attacker has to both 
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penetrate the iButton's barriers and read its contents in less than the time it takes 
to erase its private keys. 
There are specific intrusions that result in zeroization. Opening the case of the 
iButton, removing the chips metallurgically bonded substrate barricade, micro-
probing the chip or subjecting the chip to temperature extremes leads to 
zeroization.  
In addition to above, the sole I/O pin is designed in such a way that if an excess 
voltage is encountered, the I/O pin fuses and renders the chip inoperable. 
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) Information Based Indicia Program Postal 
Security Device Specification is intended to permit printing of valid U.S. postage 
on any PC. This required a combination of two areas of expertise, cryptographic 
security and high resistance to attack by hackers.  
With it zeroization capability and the private key, crypto iButton is one of the 
least counterfeitable devices. It would destroy itself rather than reveal its secret 
when tampered. The iButton in the Java Ring is Java Card 2.0 compliant. Java 
Card is a type of smart card. Next chapter explains what smart cards and Java 
Cards are and how they work and a closer look at writing applets in Java Card. 
The iButton provides different pins such as User PIN, Admin PIN and Master 
PIN that can be set on the ibutton to control the operations on the iButton. 
3.3. Java Card Technology 
The iButton is Java Card 2.0 compliant. A Java Card is a type of smart card that is 
enabled to work with Java Card Technology. To understand how a Java Card 
works and communicates, we need to know how a smart card works and its 
communication model. The next section gives an introduction to smart cards and 
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discusses how smart cards communicate. The Java Card section discusses about 
Java Card, how Java Card communicates and how the applets run in a Java Card. 
3.3.1. Smart Card: 
Smart cards are small computing devices that act as tokens to enable services that 
require security. A smart card is a type of chip card, embedded with a computer 
chip that store and transact data between users. This data in a smart card is 
associated with either value or information or both and is stored and processed 
within the card’s chip which is either a memory or microprocessor.  
A smart card resembles a credit card in size and shape, but inside it is an 
embedded 8-bit microprocessor. There are two basic kinds of smart cards: An 
intelligent smart card contains a microprocessor and offers read, write, and 
calculating capability, like a small microcomputer. A memory card, on the other 
hand, does not have a microprocessor and is meant only for information storage. 
A memory card uses security logic to control the access of memory [12]. 
In all, there are five types of smart cards: 
1. memory cards  
2. processor cards  
3. electronic purse cards  
4. security cards  
5. JavaCard  
Here processor card is the intelligent smart card. 
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A smart card can communicate by inserting it into a Card Acceptance Device 
(CAD), which may be connected to another computer. The Card Acceptance 
Device can be a terminal, reader, or interface device. They all provide the same 
basic functions such as supplying the card with power and establishing a data-
carrying connection.  
Smart Card Communication model: 
The Communication takes place in a smart card by inserting Smart Cards into a 
CAD which is connected to some computer, where the applications reside. These 
applications are known as host applications. The host applications communicate 
by sending commands to the applets in the smart cards. These commands are 
known as Command APDUs (Application Protocol Data Unit). APDU contains 
either a command or a response message. In this card model, the master-slave 
model is used whereby a smart card always plays the passive role. In other words, 
a smart card always waits for a command APDU from a terminal. It then 
executes the action specified in the APDU and replies to the terminal with a 
response APDU. Command APDUs and response APDUs are exchanged 
alternatively between a card and a terminal. A detail look at APDU is given in the 
Java Card section of the chapter. 
Smart Card Applications: 
Smart Cards are used in many applications these days. Smart cards greatly 
improve the convenience and security of any transaction. They provide tamper-
proof storage of user and account identity. Smart cards also provide vital 
components of system security for the exchange of data throughout virtually any 
type of network. They protect against a full range of security threats, from 
careless storage of user passwords to sophisticated system hacks. Multifunction 
cards can also serve as network system access and store value and other data.  
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Smart Cards are used for many applications. Smart cards can be used with a 
smart-card reader attachment to a personal computer to authenticate a user. Web 
browsers can use smart card technology to supplement Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) for improved security of Internet transactions. Smart-card readers can also 
be found in mobile phones and vending machines. 
The most common smart card applications are:  
• Credit cards  
• Electronic cash  
• Loyalty systems (like frequent flyer points)  
• Banking  
• Satellite TV  
• Government identification [14] 
3.3.2. OpenCard Framework : 
Using a smart card requires an interface for the user to be able to read the card 
and communicate with it using an application. These interfaces are implemented 
by OpenCard framework.  
OpenCard is an open standard that provides inter-operability of smart card 
applications across network computers, POS terminals, desktops, laptops, set 
tops, and PDA’s. OpenCard can provide pure Java smart card applications. Smart 
card applications often are not 100% pure because they communicate with an 
external device or use libraries on the client. 
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OpenCard provides a framework by defining interfaces that must be 
implemented. Applications using smart cards can read and communicate by 
implementing the interfaces defined by OpenCard framework. Once these 
interfaces are implemented, other services in the upper layers of the API can be 
used.  
OpenCard Framework architecture:  
The architecture of the OpenCard Framework is made up of the CardTerminal, 
the CardAgent, the Agents and/or applications that interact with these 
components. OpenCard consists of four Java packages with the prefix opencard:  
1. application  
2. io  
3. agent  
4. terminal  
The figure below gives an overview of the OpenCard Framework architecture. 
 
Figure 3.5: OpenCard Framework Architecture 
The packages opencard.application and opencard.io provide the high-level API 
used by the application developer. Classes in opencard.agent and 
opencard.terminal packages provide the services needed by the high-level API. 
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The opencard.agent package abstracts the functionality of the smart card through 
the CardAgent. The opencard.terminal package contains classes to represent the 
card-terminal hardware, to interact with the user, and to manage card-terminal 
resources. A card terminal abstracts the device that is used in a computer system 
to communicate with a smart card.  
3.3.3. Introduction to JavaCard 
JavaCard was introduced by Schlumberger and submitted as a standard by 
JavaSoft [15]. Java Card is a smart card with the potential to set the overall smart 
card standard, and is comprised of standard classes and APIs that let Java applets 
run directly on a standard ISO 7816 compliant card [15]. Java Cards enable secure 
and chip-independent execution of different applications.  
A Java Card means a smart card that is enabled to work with Java Card 
Technology. Java Card Technology allows applets written in the Java language to 
be executed on smart cards. A Java card is a smart card that is able to execute 
Java byte code, similar to the way Java-enabled browsers can execute. But 
standard Java with all of its libraries is far too big to fit on a smart card. A 
solution to this problem is a stripped-down flavor of Java. Java Card is a special, 
stripped-down version of Java that runs on a smartcard itself. In whole, Java Card 
Technology provides JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment) together with 
other classes and APIs for developers to create applets to be executed on smart 
cards. It is based on a subset of the Java API plus some special-purpose card 
commands. Unlike smartcard products which have only one application per card, 
Java Card allows smart cards to have multiple applications on them. The 
minimum system requirement is 16 kilobytes of read-only memory (ROM), 8 
kilobytes of EEPROM, and 256 bytes of random access memory (RAM). 
The system architecture on the Java Card is illustrated in the following figure.  
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Figure 3.6: Java Card System Architecture 
As shown in the figure, the Java Card VM is built on top of a specific integrated 
circuit (IC) and native operating system implementation. The JVM layer hides the 
manufacturer's proprietary technology with a common language and system 
interface. The Java Card framework defines a set of Application Programming 
Interface (API) classes for developing Java Card applications and for providing 
system services to those applications. Add-on libraries to provide a service or to 
refine the security and system model are supplied by specific industry or business 
supplies. Java Card applications are called applets. Multiple applets can reside on 
one card. Each applet is identified uniquely by its AID (application identifier), as 
defined in ISO 7816 [19]. 
The Java Card virtual machine separates applications from the underlying 
hardware and operating system. The Java Card platform’s standardized API 
provides a uniform interface to disparate smart cards. This unique approach uses 
the widely-understood benefits of object-oriented programming to enable 
security at both the application and platform level [22]. 
Due to limited memory resources and computing power, the Java Card 
specifically, does not support:  
• Dynamic class loading  
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• Security manager  
• Threads and synchronization  
• Object cloning  
• Finalization  
• Large primitive data types (float, double, long) and char data type [17] 
3.3.4. Java Card and OpenCard:  
An OpenCard Framework is Java in the computer or terminal talking to a 
smartcard. Java applications running on a PC can use OpenCard to access Java 
Card smart cards and standard smart cards. Java applets (also known as cardlets) 
can be written and run on Java Card which is compliant with the Java Card 
standard. OpenCard is the ideal host-side application framework for accessing 
Java Card. Any smart card to access Java Card needs a card service which 
supports the interfaces of Java Card applet [13]. 
3.3.5. Java Card Applets: 
When a Java Card is inserted, the Card Acceptance Device (CAD) accepts the 
Java Card and selects an applet which sends a series of commands to execute. 
Each applet in a Java Card is identified and selected by its unique Application 
Identifier (AID). Commands are formatted and transmitted between the 
application and the applets using Application Protocol Data Units (APDU). 
Applets reply to each APDU command as status words. Applets can optionally 
reply to an APDU with other data. The communication between the applet and 
the application are discussed in detail in the next part. 
Briefly, applet designing requires: 
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• Specifying the working functionality of the applet 
• Requesting and assigning AIDs to both the applet and the packages 
containing the applet class  
• Designing the class structure of the program and  
• Defining the interface between the applet and the terminal application. 
Interface between an Applet in Java Card and Its Terminal Application: 
The APDU is like an interface between an applet and the application hosted on 
the CAD. All the communication between an applet and the application hosted 
on the Cad is carried by the APDU. 
APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit): 
• APDU commands are always a set of pairs. Each pair contains a 
Command APDU and a Response APDU. A Command APDU specifies 
a command sent by the application through a CAD, and response APDU 
specifies the result executed by the applet.  
• The terminal application sends a command APDU through the CAD. 
The JCRE receives the command and either selects a new applet or 
passes the command to the currently selected applet, which processes the 
command and returns a response APDU to the terminal application. 
Command APDU and response APDU are exchanged alternately 
between a card and a CAD.  
• APDU Format 
 26
Command APDU 
Mandatory header Optional header 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
Field 
Le 
       CLA (1 byte): Class of instruction -- indicates the structure and format for a 
category   of command and response APDUs. 
        INS (1 byte): Instruction code: specifies the instruction of the command. 
        P1 (1 byte) and P2 (1 byte): Instruction parameter.  
        Lc (1 byte): Number of bytes present in the data field of the command. 
        Data field (bytes equal to the value of Lc): Data in the form of sequence of  
bytes. 
        Le (1 byte): Maximum of bytes expected in the data field of response 
command. 
Response APDU 
Optional Body Mandatory trailer 
Data field SW1 SW2 
      Data field (variable length): A sequence of bytes received in the data field of 
the response. 
         SW1 (1 byte) and SW2 (1 byte): Status Words -- denote the processing state 
in the card. 
Figure 3.7: Command and Response APDU 
Structure 
CLA - The CLA field is meant to be used as control data. Normally, each applet 
has one CLA. A normal use of the CLA field is to insure that the host is talking 
to the correct applet. For example, normally, the first thing that occurs in the 
process method is to check whether the CLA in the commandAPDU just 
received matches the CLA of that applet. If not, it should return with an error. 
Example:  
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        final static private byte THIS_APPLET_CLA = (byte)0x80; 
        ...  
        public void process(APDU apdu) 
        { 
            byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
            //Check for a valid CLA. 
            if(buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] != THIS_APPLET_CLA) 
            { 
                ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
            } 
            ... 
 
INS - The INS field is meant to be used to tell the applet what instruction the 
host wishes to be performed. The particular value of the instruction bytes do not 
matter, as long as the applet and host both know what numbers each instruction 
corresponds to. For example, both a host and its corresponding applet might 
have the following declarations:  
        // BEGIN INSTRUCTION DECLARATIONS 
 
        public static final byte BASICS_CLA = (byte)0x80; 
        public static final byte BASICS_INS_STORE_NUMBER = (byte)0; 
        public static final byte BASICS_INS_GET_NUMBER = (byte)1; 
 
        // END INSTRUCTION DECLARATIONS     
 
The process method would perform the appropriate instruction by doing a switch 
on the INS field of the apdu, calling the appropriate method:  
        //Call the appropriate dispatch method for the given INS. 
        switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) 
        { 
            case BASICS_INS_STORE_NUMBER: 
                store_numberDispatch(apdu, buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P1], 
                                    buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P2]); 
            break; 
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            case BASICS_INS_GET_NUMBER: 
                get_numberDispatch(apdu, buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P1], 
                                    buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P2]); 
            break; 
 
            default: 
                ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
        }  
P1 & P2 - The P1 and P2 fields are normally used as additional control data. For 
example, if you had an instruction to sort a byte array on the iButton with the 
option to sort forwards or backwards. You may not want to break that up into 
separate instructions. Instead, you could pass the same instruction, and set a value 
of P1 or P2 to indicate how the array should be sorted. 
DATA - This field contains the data (in the form of a byte array) sent. An 
example of how to access this data follows:  
 
        public void process(APDU apdu) 
        { 
            ... 
            byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
            apduData = new byte[buffer[ISO.OFFSET_LC] & 0x0FF]; 
            short apduDataOffset = 0; 
            //Read in the entire APDU. 
            short bytesRead = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); 
            //Loop until all bytes have been read. 
            while (bytesRead > 0) 
            { 
                Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer, ISO.OFFSET_CDATA, apduData, 
                apduDataOffset, bytesRead); 
                apduDataOffset += bytesRead; 
                bytesRead = apdu.receiveBytes(ISO.OFFSET_CDATA); 
            } 
            /*********************************************** 
             *   The byte array apduData now contains the 
             *   data sent from the host to the applet. 
             ***********************************************/ 
            ... 
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Functionality inside a Java Card: 
Inside a Java Card, JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment) refers to the Java 
Card virtual machine and the classes in the Java Card Framework. JCRE assigns 
the unique AID to each applet within a Java Card. After an applet is correctly 
loaded into the card's persistent memory and linked with the Java Card 
Framework and other libraries on the card, JCRE calls the applet's install method 
as the last step in the applet installation process. A public static method, install, 
must be implemented by an applet class to create an instance of the applet and 
register it with JCRE. 
An applet on the card remains inactive until it is explicitly selected. The terminal 
sends a select APDU command to JCRE. JCRE suspends the currently selected 
applet and invokes the applet's deselect method to perform any necessary 
cleanup. JCRE then marks the applet whose AID is specified in the select APDU 
command as the currently selected applet and calls the newly selected applet's 
select method. The select method prepares the applet to accept APDU 
commands. JCRE dispatches the subsequent APDU commands to the currently 
selected applet until it receives the next select APDU command.  
3.4. Programming in iButton : 
Programming for the iButton requires writing both a host application and an 
iButton applet. These two are completely separate Java programs that will 
communicate with each other but be executed on two different machines. 
The host application resides on a personal computer or embedded system. Its 
function is to send control instructions and data to the iButton applet, collect and 
interpret the response data received, and output the results in some form to the 
user. A detailed explanation of the structure of a host application is given in the 
Host Application Structure part of this section. 
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The applet is downloaded and run on the iButton itself. Once installed and 
selected to run, it waits to process host instructions. A detailed explanation of the 
structure of an iButton applet is given in the iButton Applet Structure part of this 
section. 
3.4.1. Host Application Structure: 
The host application is responsible for controlling the iButton applet. It allows a 
user to interact with the applet, sending command instructions and displaying 
output. 
The host code, with full security access, has complete control of the iButton. It 
can retrieve and erase an iButton's contents, download an applet, or select a 
particular applet already installed on the button to run. 
Host Interface 
A host application must implement opencard.core.event.CTListener. This allows 
the host application to receive events when an iButton is inserted or removed. A 
host that implements CTListener must implement the methods cardInserted and 
cardRemoved. A CardTerminalEvent is the parameter to these methods, and can 
be used to obtain a SlotChannel, which is used to send APDU's to the iButton.  
Host and Applet Communication 
As mentioned before, because iButton is Java Card 2.0 compliant, the host and 
applet in iButton communicate using APDUs. The host sends CommandAPDUs 
to the iButton, each containing an instruction and any data which needs to be 
sent. The iButton processes the instructions and sends a ResponseAPDU back to 
the host that contains any data to be returned plus a status word that indicates 
whether or not the instruction completed successfully. The data in the command 
and the response APDU is sent in the form of a byte array. A successful 
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execution, which means no errors or exceptions, occurred in processing the 
instruction is indicated with a status word of 0x9000 [21]. 
The host application must know the class and instruction bytes of each iButton 
applet it expects to control. These bytes are passed in the CommandAPDU 
header and will tell the applet what action to perform. The class byte is generally 
used as identification for the applet. Normally, most applets have one class byte 
(usually named CLASSNAME_CLA) that it references each time a 
CommandAPDU arrives from the host application. If the class byte sent from 
the host doesn't match the class byte of the applet, it throws an 
ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED exception. In concert with the instruction 
byte, it can be used to act as additional control data. 
Since a host application can't make a remote function call on the iButton, it has to 
send commands to indicate what functions to call or what actions to perform. 
The instruction byte of the CommandAPDU carries this information. Suppose 
an applet has designated the byte 0x04 to perform ‘exclusive or’ on two 
hardcoded integers, the host knows it wants the iButton to perform this action, it 
would send a CommandAPDU with applet's class byte and an instruction byte of 
0x04. 
The structure of a Host Application is shown below: [21] 
Minimal Host Application, OpenCard API 
import opencard.core.event.*; 
import opencard.core.service.*; 
import opencard.core.terminal.*; 
import opencard.opt.applet.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import java.io.*; 
public class ocf_Host implements CTListener 
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{ 
    public static final byte OCF_CLA = (byte)0x80; 
    public static final byte OCF_INS_EXECUTE = (byte)0; 
    /** 
     * Sets up the listener for iButton inserted and iButton 
     * removed events. 
     *  
    * @param appletPath  the path to the applet that should 
     *                    be loaded into the iButtons. 
     * @param appletName  the name of the applet that should 
     *                    be loaded into the iButtons. 
     */ 
    public ocf_Host() 
    { 
        //************************************* 
        //* Add any initialization code here. * 
        //************************************* 
        try        { 
            opencard.core.service.SmartCard.start();    
            CardTerminalRegistry reg = CardTerminalRegistry.getRegistry(); 
            reg.addCTListener(this); 
            reg.createEventsForPresentCards(this); 
        }       catch(Exception e) 
        { 
            System.out.println("Caught an exception: "+e.toString()); 
            System.exit(0); 
        } 
    } 
    /** 
     * Called when an iButton gets inserted. 
     * 
     * @param event  the insertion event. 
     */ 
    public void cardInserted(CardTerminalEvent ctevent) 
    { 
        System.out.println("Card has been inserted"); 
        SlotChannel sc = null; 
        try        {  
            /*************************************************** 
             * Note that a SmartCard object and a SlotChannel  * 
             * object cannot both exist at the same time.  One * 
             * must close so you can open the other!           * 
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             ***************************************************/ 
            CardTerminal ct = ctevent.getSlot().getCardTerminal(); 
            int slotid = ctevent.getSlot().getSlotID(); 
            Object lock = new Object(); 
            sc = ct.openSlotChannel(slotid, lock); 
            //***************************************** 
            //* Insert any code to be done when       * 
            //* an iButton is inserted here,          * 
            //* using the SlotChannel object 'sc'     * 
            //***************************************** 
            executeDispatch(sc); 
        }        catch(CardTerminalException cte) 
        { 
            System.err.println("ERROR:  CardTerminalException occurred while 
communicating with iButton."); 
            cte.printStackTrace(); 
        }        catch(IOException ioe) 
        {            System.out.println("IO Exception"); 
            ioe.printStackTrace(); 
        }        catch(Exception e) 
        { 
 
           //Exceptions that occur in iButtonInserted events 
            //will be drained in the OpenCard internals if we 
            //don't catch them here. 
            System.err.println("Exception in cardInserted:"); 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        finally        { 
            //we must ALWAYS close the slot channel!!! 
            try 
            {     if (sc!=null) 
                sc.close(); 
            }            catch(CardTerminalException cte) 
          {  
               // drain 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    /** 
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iButton Applet Structure: 
The iButton applet runs on the iButton itself. It receives and executes 
instructions from the host. After an applet has been downloaded to the iButton 
and selected, it waits for Command APDU's to be sent from the host. When an 
APDU is received, the applet's process method is called to handle the command. 
The process method should perform the correct function for the instruction 
contained in the APDU and will automatically return a Response APDU. This 
response APDU contains any data the applet writes out, and a status word 
indicating the success or failure of executing the instruction. 
Data Types 
The iButton applet has the following data types available: int, short, byte, 
boolean, and one dimensional arrays. There is no String data type available on the 
iButton. String data should be saved into a byte array in order to be used in an 
iButton applet. 
Structure: 
An applet written to run on the Java ring follows a very simple structure. The 
iButton applet must extend javacard.framework.Applet and must override the 
constructor, the install method, and the process method. The constructor must 
first make a call to the register() function, which registers this applet with the 
JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment). The process of writing an applet is very 
similar to applet programming in that there are several methods that you have to 
override. These methods are:  
• deselect -- another applet, or possibly this one, is about to be selected  
• install -- installs the applet  
• process -- incoming APDUs arrive here  
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• register -- register applet  
• select -- called when a select command is received  
The static install method should create a new instance of this applet. The process 
method should perform the appropriate function based on the instruction passed 
in the APDU. The process method will be called when the applet is selected. So it 
should check to see if selection is the reason it is being called. (If the applet is 
being selected, then the CLA will be 0x00, and the INS will be 0xA4.)  
The workings of the process() with the APDU is shown in the figure below. The 
APDU commands are sent from the host (client) application as shown in the 
figure below.  
 
Figure 3.8: Workings of the APDU from the reader 
side to the card side 
The basic structure of an iButton applet is as shown below 
import javacard.framework.*; 
public class Basics_Applet extends Applet 
{ 
    ... 
   public Basics_Applet() 
    { 
        //Register this applet with the JCRE 
        register(); 
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        //************************************** 
        //* Add any initialization code here. * 
        //************************************** 
    } 
    public static void install(APDU apdu) 
    { 
        new Basics_Applet(); 
    } 
    public void process(APDU apdu) 
    { 
        byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
 
        //Determine if the applet is being selected. 
 
        if((buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] == SELECT_CLA) && 
        (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS] == SELECT_INS)) 
        { 
            //*********************************** 
            //* Add any code to be executed on * 
            //* applet selection here. * 
            //*********************************** 
            return; 
        } 
        //Check for a valid CLA. 
        if(buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] != BASICS_CLA)  
        { 
            ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
        } 
        else        { 
            //Call the appropriate dispatch method for the given INS. 
            switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) 
            { 
                case BASICS_INS_STORE_NUMBER: 
                    store_numberDispatch(apdu, buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P1], 
                                                buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P2]); 
                break; 
 
                case BASICS_INS_GET_NUMBER: 
                    get_numberDispatch(apdu, buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P1], 
                                            buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P2]); 
                break; 
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                default: 
                    ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    ... 
 
Java developers must override at least the install and process methods of the 
super class, Applet. In simple applets such as Business Card discussed next, install 
simply constructs a new instance. It is the job of the constructor to register the 
applet with the Java Card runtime environment (JCRE).  
The following code segment demonstrates how to override the install method. [9] 
The install method is normally used to set up the applet environment. Simple 
applets may be ready to run after calling install. More complicated applets may 
require additional initialization sequences. The code in the process method is not 
given below. 
class BusinessCard extends Applet {  
   public BusinessCard() {  
      // Register our applet with the JCRE  
      register(); 
   }  
   public static void install(APDU apdu) {  
      new BusinessCard(); 
   }  
   public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException {  
      .  
      .  
      . 
   }  
   .  
   .  
   . 
}  
In order to communicate with the host, the card terminal, the applet must 
implement the process method. This method is invoked on the selected applet 
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whenever a command APDU is received from the host. Following is a segment 
of BusinessCard's implementation of the process method. Its structure is typical 
of Java Card applets.  
public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException {  
   byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer();  
   // process selects separately  
   .  
   .  
   . 
   if (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] != BC_CLA) {  
      // Don't know what to do with this instruction  
      throw new ISOException(ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
   }  
   else {  
      switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) {  
      // Store new business card data  
      case BC_INS_STORE:  
         businessCardStore(apdu);  
         break; 
      // Send business card data to the host  
      case BC_INS_RETRIEVE:  
         businessCardRetrieve(apdu);  
         break; 
      // Don't know what to do with this instruction  
      default:  
         throw new ISOException(ISO.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
      } 
   } 
}  
 
As mentioned before, the main purpose of the process method is to invoke the 
correct dispatch method. If process has trouble understanding the header, it will 
throw an instance of ISOException with the appropriate status code. 
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3.5. Java Card Applet Example: 
The following example is an electronic wallet application, which stores electronic 
cash. The wallet handles read_balance, deposit, and debits APDU commands. 
Access to the wallet is authenticated by an owner PIN [17]. 
The example is formatted in two columns: The left column contains Java code 
with Java style comments; the right column provides further explanation of the 
code that it lines up with on the left side. 
package bank.purse; Java Card supports 
package and identifier 
name convention as in 
standard Java 
import javacard.framework.*; 
import javacardx.framework.*;  
  
public class Wallet extends Applet {  
  /* constants declaration */  
An applet is an instance of 
a class which extends from 
javacard.framework.Applet
  // code of CLA byte in the command APDU header  
  final static byte Wallet_CLA =(byte)0xB0;  
CLA identifies the 
application 
  // codes of INS byte in the command APDU header 
  final static byte Deposit = (byte) 0x10;  
  final static byte Debit = (byte) 0x20; 
   
INS specifies the 
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  final static byte Balance = (byte) 0x30;  
  final static byte Validate = (byte) 0x40; 
application instructions 
  // maximum number of incorrect tries before the PIN is 
blocked 
  final static byte PinTryLimit =(byte)0x03; 
  // maximum size PIN 
  final static byte MaxPinSize =(byte)0x04; 
 
PIN object parameters  
  // status word (SW1-SW2) to signal that the balance becomes 
negative; 
  final static short SW_NEGATIVE_BALANCE = (short) 
0x6910; 
Applet specific static word 
  /* instance variables declaration */  
  OwnerPIN pin; 
  byte balance; 
  byte buffer[];  
// APDU buffer 
  
 
  private Wallet() {  
    // It is good programming practice to allocate 
   
private constructor -- an 
instance of class Wallet is 
instantiated by its install 
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    // all the memory that an applet needs during its 
    // lifetime inside the constructor 
    pin = new OwnerPIN(PinTryLimit, MaxPinSize); 
    balance = 0;  
    register();  
  } // end of the constructor  
method. Applet registers 
itself with JCRE by calling 
register method, which is 
defined in class Applet. 
Now the applet is visible 
to the outside world 
   public static void install(APDU apdu){  
    // create a Wallet applet instance 
    new Wallet();  
  } // end of  
install method 
  
Method install is invoked 
by JCRE as the last step in 
the applet installation 
process 
    public boolean select() {  
    // reset validation flag in the PIN object to false  
    pin.reset();  
    // returns true to JCRE to indicate that the applet  
 
    // is ready to accept incoming APDUs. 
   
This method is called by 
JCRE to inform that this 
applet has been selected. It 
performs necessary 
initialization which is 
required to process the 
following APDU 
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    return true;  
  }// end of select method  
messages. 
 
  public void process(APDU apdu) {  
    // APDU object carries a byte array (buffer) to  
    // transfer incoming and outgoing APDU header  
    // and data bytes between card and CAD 
    buffer = apdu.getBuffer();  
   
After the applet is 
successfully selected, 
JCRE dispatches incoming 
APDUs to this method.  
APDU object is owned 
and maintained by JCRE. 
It encapsulates details of 
the underlying 
transmission protocol (T0 
or T1 as specified in ISO 
7816-3) by providing a 
common interface.  
    // verify that if the applet can accept this 
    // APDU message  
    if (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] !== Wallet_CLA)  
      ISOException.throwIt 
           (ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
When an error occurs, the 
applet may decide to 
terminate the process and 
throw an exception 
containing status word 
(SW1 SW2) to indicate the 
processing state of the 
card.  
An exception that is not 
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caught by an applet is 
caught by JCRE. 
    switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) { 
      case Balance:   getBalance(apdu); return;  
      case Debit:  
  debit(apdu); return;  
      case Deposit:   deposit(apdu);return; 
      case Validate:    validate(apdu);return  
 
      default:  
  ISOException.throwIt 
             (ISO.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED);  
    }  
}   // end of process method 
The main function of 
process method is to 
perform an action as 
specified in APDU  
and returns an appropriate 
response to the terminal. 
INS byte specifies the type 
of action needs to be 
performed  
 
  private void deposit(APDU apdu) {  
    // access authentication 
    if ( ! pin.isValidated() ) 
      ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_PIN_REQUIRED);  
   
The parameter APDU 
object contains a data 
field, which specifies the 
amount to be added onto 
the balance.  
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    // Lc byte denotes the number of bytes in the data  
 
    // field of the comamnd APDU 
    byte numBytes = (byte) (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_LC]);  
    // indicate that this APDU has incoming data and 
    // receive data starting from the offset  
    // ISO.OFFSET_CDATA 
    byte byteRead = (byte)(apdu.setIncomingAndReceive());  
    // it is an error if the number of data bytes read does  
not  
    // match the number in Lc byte 
    if (byteRead != 1)  
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_WRONG_LENGTh);  
    // increase the balance by the amount specified in the  
    // data field of the command APDU. 
    balance = (byte) 
      (balance + buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CDATA]);  
    // return successfully 
    return;  
} // end of deposit method 
Upon receiving the APDU 
object from JCRE, the 
first 5 bytes (CLA, INS, 
P1, P2, Lc/Le) are 
available in the APDU 
buffer. Their offsets in the 
APDU buffer are specified 
in the class ISO. Because 
the data field is optional, 
the applet needs to 
explicitly inform JCRE to 
retrieve additional data 
bytes.  
The communication 
between card and CAD is 
exchanged between 
command APDU and 
response APDU pair. In 
the deposit case, the 
response APDU contains 
no data field. JCRE would 
take the status word 
0x9000 (normal 
processing) to form the 
correct response APDU. 
Applet developers do not 
need to concern the details 
of constructing the proper 
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response APDU.  
When JCRE catches an 
Exception, which signals 
an error during processing 
the command, JCRE 
would use the status word 
contained in the Exception 
to construct the response 
APDU. 
 
  private void debit(APDU apdu) {  
    // access authentication 
    if ( ! pin.isValidated() ) 
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_PIN_REQUIRED);  
    byte numBytes = (byte)(buffer[ISO.OFFSET_LC]); 
    byte byteRead = (byte)(apdu.setIncomingAndReceive());  
    if (byteRead != 1)  
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
    // balance can not be negative 
    if ( ( balance - buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CDATA]) < 0 )  
      ISOException.throwIt(SW_NEGATIVE_BALANCE); 
    balance = (byte)  
   
In debit method, The 
APDU object contains a 
data field, which specifies 
the amount to be 
decrement from the 
balance  
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        (balance - buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CDATA]);  
} // end of debit method  
 
  private void getBalance(APDU apdu) {  
    // access authentication 
    if ( ! pin.isValidated() ) 
      ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_PIN_REQUIRED);  
    // inform system that the applet has finished processing 
    // the command and the system should now prepare to  
    // construct a response APDU which contains data field 
    apdu.setOutgoing();  
    // indicate the number of bytes in the data field 
    apdu.setOutgoingLength((byte)1);  
    // move the data into the APDU buffer starting at offset 0 
    buffer[0] = balance;  
    // send 1 byte of data at offset 0 in the APDU buffer 
    apdu.sendBytes((short)0, (short)1);  
} // end of getBalance method 
 
getBalance returns the 
Wallet’s balance in the 
data field of the response 
APDU.  
Because the data field in 
response APDU is 
optional, the applet needs 
to explicitly inform JCRE 
of the additional data. 
JCRE uses the data array 
in the APDU object buffer 
and the proper status word 
to construct a complete 
response APDU.  
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private void validate(APDU apdu) {  
    // retrieve the PIN data which requires to be valid ated 
    // the user interface data is stored in the data field of the  
APDU 
    byte byteRead = (byte)(apdu.setIncomingAndReceive());  
    // validate user interface and set the validation flag in the  
user interface 
    // object to be true if the validation succeeds. 
    // if user interface validation fails, PinException would be  
 
    // thrown from pin.check() method. 
    pin.check(buffer, ISO.OFFSET_CDATA, byteRead);  
  } // end of validate method  
} // end of class Wallet  
PIN is a method 
commonly used in smart 
cards to protect data from 
unauthorized access  
A PIN records the 
number of unsuccessful 
tries since the last correct 
PIN verification. The card 
would be blocked, if the 
number of unsuccessful 
tries exceeds the 
maximum number of 
allowed tries defined in the 
PIN.  
After the applet is 
successfully selected, PIN 
needs to be validated first, 
before any other 
instruction can be 
performed on the applet 
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C h a p t e r  4  
FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATOR 
4.1. Introduction to Fingerprint Authenticator: 
Biometrics is defined in the security industry as a measurable physical 
characteristic or personal behavioral trait used to recognize the identity or verify 
the claimed identity of a person and biometric identification is the use of 
computers to confirm the identity of a user [24]. 
Unlike other ways of authentication such as passwords – something a person 
knows, security device – something a person possess, biometrics deals with 
something a person is. While a password and a security device can be stolen, a 
biometric cannot be stolen and is always with you. Biometrics have proven to be 
an effective solution for high-security access control, ensuring that only 
authorized individuals can access protected or secure data. Biometric systems 
require controlled and accurate enrollment processes, careful monitoring of 
security settings to ensure that the risk of unauthorized entry is low and well-
designed interfaces to ensure rapid acquisition and matching. 
There are many types of biometrics available such as fingerprint recognition, 
voice recognition, face recognition, retina, iris and DNA. Given below are some 
of the biometrics used for authentication purposes [24]. 
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Figure 4.1: Different Biometrics 
The first image is a finger print, second a spatial thermogram where an infrared 
image of the face is obtained by the heat emitted from the face. The third image 
shows the hand geometry, fourth face recognition, fifth heat emitted by the hand, 
sixth iris, seventh retina scan where a light is used to scan the retina, eight speech 
recognition and ninth signature. 
The next image shows how most of the biometrics can have complexities 
involved and cannot be accurate all the time. The first image shows how complex 
face recognition system works as it has to consider different aspects such as 
taking images of the person from different angles as well take the different 
expressions of the person into consideration. The second image shows the 
handwriting of a person at different times and different conditions (e.g., when the 
person is ill or when a person is drunk). In this case, it reveals more information 
about the person than required. Using DNA for authentication also has the same 
drawback of revealing more information about the person. The next image shows 
how a person is disguised in different ways and can fool a face recognition 
system. Hence, face recognition also has its set of complexities. 
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Figure 4.2: Face Recognition and Handwriting [24] 
As the complexity involved with fingerprint is not as much as with other kinds of 
biometric authentication, fingerprint authentication is considered a better way of 
authentication. Since different fingers have different ridges and characteristics, 
these minute details help to identify a person and do not reveal other information 
about the person than required. These minute details are permanent for each 
person. Even identical twins have different fingerprints. Fingerprints have a long 
history and are considered to be unique. Fingerprint impressions in clay tablets 
over 2000 years old have been seen in archaeological materials from both China 
and the Middle East.  Fingerprinting received a scientific basis through work 
performed in the 19th and 20th century by a wide variety of researchers and 
institutions [28]. 
The problem with fingerprints is that the fingerprint sensor can be fooled. Here 
are some of the cases where fingerprint sensors were fooled. 
• Dr. Matsumoto used procedures to create gelatin ‘gummy fingers’ that 
possessed the same fingerprint geometry and minutiae as a live finger. 
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This can be done by lifting a latent print from a sensor or spoofing with 
an easily crafted gummy finger made of a home made gelatin mold [25]. 
Fingerprints are lifted from objects such as a coffee cup and a gummy 
finger is created and touched up using a microscope. 
• Reactivating a latent fingerprint by placing a water-filled plastic bag on the 
sensor or brushing graphite powder on the sensor and applying pressure 
to an adhesive film on top of the powder are some of the other ways of 
fooling a fingerprint sensor [26]. 
• Latent prints placed on a transparency by simply pressing on the surface. 
The prints are increased in clarity and contrast by using a black latent 
print powder. After brushing away the excess powder, the latent 
fingerprint is lifted using scotch tape. The tape and print is then placed on 
to the sensor with the sticky side down and pressure is applied to activate 
the sensor. [26]. 
• A Milpitas, California-based company claims to have addressed some 
fingerprint fooling methods with a technology that relies on a 
combination of a new algorithm and monitoring of physical changes to 
the optical sensor reading the print [25]. 
• Factors such as calluses, dryness, moisture or the affects of aging can 
affect the image capturing of the fingerprint sensor. 
There are many fingerprint authentication products available in the market. The 
fingerprint sensor used in this thesis application is an Authentec AES 4000.  
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Figure 4.3: The Entrepad Family Authentec 
AES4000 
This fingerprint uses Trueprint technology.  
4.1.1. TruePrint Technology: 
TruePrint based fingerprint sensors are small components that can be easily 
designed into almost any electronic device.  The user simply places his finger flat 
on the sensor surface to activate the system.  The sensor generates an image of 
the pattern in the finger skin that touches it.  
TruePrint technology sensors can capture images from beneath the surface of the 
skin where the ridge-and-valley pattern suffers less damage from day-to-day 
living. It is this technology that does not let the fingerprint sensor be fooled by a 
gummy finger or any of the sensor fooling methods mentioned before. By 
looking below the surface layer of the skin, TruePrint Technology reads the real 
fingerprint, producing an unaffected, undistorted image, thus avoiding the 
limitations of previous techniques where the upper layer of the finger is scanned. 
Unlike prior approaches, skin surface conditions such as calluses, dryness, 
moisture or the effects of aging do not limit the image capturing ability. 
Contaminants such as ink, paint or glue have little or no effect as it is the second 
layer that is scanned. 
4.1.2. Security concern with storing fingerprints: 
The reality is that once personal information such as a fingerprint has been 
provided to an external medium the individual no longer has the capacity to 
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control who will be able to peruse or access it. To date, this lack of control has 
been subject to the limitations of regulation and of the technology itself.  
The authentication system in this project provides a solution. It allows individuals 
to control the access themselves - thus rendering individuals no longer impotent 
to the vulnerability of computers, databases and software or to accidents, 
malfunction or intrusion. This project aims to hand the individual back control of 
their identity. This is done by storing the fingerprint in the iButton of the Java 
Ring which an individual carries with him. This is discussed in the 
implementation part in chapter 5. 
4.2. Authentec API: 
The fingerprint system used in this thesis provides the developers of the 
AuthenTec fingerprint biometrics with AuthenTec Windows Fingerprint System 
(AWFS) API library. In further sections of the thesis AuthenTec Windows 
Fingerprint System is referenced as AWFS. 
The next part of this chapter goes through the fundamentals of AWFS API and 
discusses all the terms and functions needed in the thesis. 
The AWFS API supports a comprehensive set of functions for single application 
using a single sensor. It provides functions for fingerprint database management 
to store user and fingerprint data and algorithms for extracting template data 
from fingerprint images and for matching fingerprint template data. 
Below are some of the definitions and terminology used through the project. 
Binary Large Object (BLOB): In the context of the AWFS, a BLOB is an 
application generated array of bytes. An application can specify the size of (in 
bytes) and save, retrieve or delete a BLOB of information data for a user. When 
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an enrollment takes place, the template is stored in BLOB. The AWFS allows an 
application to store arbitrary information (in addition to templates) for a user in 
the form of a BLOB in the AWFS database.  
Enrollment: The process by which the reference template for a user is 
constructed and stored in a database is called Enrollment. This is done by 
collecting one or more images from the fingerprint sensor, extracting salient 
feature data and combining these results to make a template. 
Identification: A match operation in which a fingerprint is compared to 
templates in an AWFS database to determine the identity, i.e., name and finger 
number, associated with the fingerprint.  
Image Item: An image item is an opaque structure that is used by the AWFS to 
pass image data to and receive image data from an application. An image item 
contains pixel data, sizing data and other AWFS proprietary data.  
Match Template: A template that is created during an authentication operation 
from one or more images acquired from the sensor is called a Match template. 
During authentication, match templates are compared to reference templates to 
determine if they represent the same fingerprint.  
Reference Template: A template created during the enrollment process is called 
a Reference Template.  
Validation: A special case of identification where the template of a user has to be 
specified is called Validation. A fingerprint is matched against only those 
templates in the AWFS database for a specified user to determine if there is a 
match.  
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Verification: A match operation in which a finger print is matched against an 
application-supplied list of templates. An application will use a verification 
operation when it maintains reference templates in its own database.  
Sensor Interface: 
The AWFS software can support from 1 to 36 physical sensors attached to a 
single system. This application uses a single sensor 
AT_RESULT_CODE ATOpenSensor ( 
 TCHAR*   pszStrSensorName,  
  int16   AccessMode )  
 
An application must call ATOpenSensor() to open an AWFS sensor prior to 
performing any sensor access functions. The first parameter, pszStrSensorName, in 
the function is the name of the sensor to open. In the most common usage case, 
a system with a single unnamed sensor, an application will pass NULL for the 
sensor name. If pszStrSensorName is non-NULL, it must be the name assigned to 
the sensor by running the ATSensorWizzard.  
Database Services: 
A proprietary database is provided by AWFS to store user data and templates 
extracted from fingerprint images. AWFS database stores the templates during 
the enrollment process or by database update procedures. The AWFS database 
can be managed and queried using the functions provided by the AWFS API. 
Information stored in AWFS proprietary databases is fully encrypted to maintain 
security. An application can use its own template storage database instead of 
AWFS database. In such case, the application must present fingerprint templates 
to the AWFS system at the beginning of a matching operation. 
 56
Some of the features of the AWFS database are as follows: 
Shareable and Exclusive Use Databases: An application using an AWFS 
database can open it with either shared or exclusive access. When more than one 
application need the same user data and need to access the same database, shared 
access database is used. A database can be opened with exclusive access when an 
application wants to preclude use of the database by other applications or 
processes.  
Support for Binary Large Objects: The AWFS database provides functions to 
save and retrieve application-defined binary data for a user. The AWFS is not 
concerned with the data content of this user information and deals with this user 
data as a Binary Large Object (BLOB). A BLOB has no structure that can be 
interpreted by the AWFS and is known only by its size in bytes [30]. 
Deletion of Stored Data: The AWFS provides functions to delete specified 
templates for a user, to delete all data for a user and to delete all data for all users.  
Database Query Support: The AWFS provides functions to get a count of the 
number of users in the database, to obtain a list of all users enrolled in the 
database and to obtain a list of fingers enrolled for a given user.  
Some of the functions of AWFS database are creating a database, opening a 
database, closing a database. An application using an AWFS database must open 
it before performing any database read, write or delete functions. An error will be 
returned to the application if it fails to open a database prior to calling an AWFS 
API function. An application calls ATOpenDatabase() to create a new database or 
to open an existing database.  
AT_RESULT_CODE ATOpenDatabase(  
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TCHAR* pszStrDatabaseFile, 
int32        iAccessMode,  
uint32       iMemorySize,  
void*        pAuthenRec,  
uint32       iSizeAuthenRec)  
 
The first parameter, pszStrDatabaseFile, defines the pathname and filename of the 
file to be used for persistent database storage. A new database will be created if 
the specified filename does not exist. If the filename exists, the specified database 
is loaded for use. 
The second parameter, iAccessMode, specifies the database access mode as either 
AT_DATABASE_ACCESS_SHARE or 
AT_DATABASE_ACCESS_EXCLUSIVE. The access mode is established by 
the first application or process that opens a named database. The established 
access mode for a named database remains in effect until the last application or 
process that has opened the database closes it. In shared access, an application 
can receive notification when the database is modified by another application. A 
database size can optionally be specified in the ATOpenDatabase() call.  
The third parameter, iMemorySize, which defines the database size is used to 
apprise the AWFS of the amount of memory to allocate for the database. This is 
useful in case where there are a large number of users and fingers to be enrolled. 
It is more efficient to initially allocate a large block of memory than to reallocate 
memory on-the-fly as users are added [30]. The ATGetEstimatedDatabaseSize() API 
function provides an estimated database size based on the number of users, 
templates, BLOBS, etc. it will maintain. If an application specifies zero for the 
memory size parameter in the ATOpenDatabase() call, the AWFS will use default 
sizing values to allocate database memory buffers. The AWFS will automatically 
increase the size of its database memory buffers as needed when new data are 
added.  
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When a database is created, an optional application-defined certificate of 
authenticity is assigned to a database by specifying the certificate in the 
ATOpenDatabase() function. A certificate is specified if pAuthenRec is non-NULL 
and iSizeAuthenRec is non-zero. This certificate must be supplied in all subsequent 
ATOpenDatabase() calls for that database, regardless of whether the database is 
being opened by the creating application or by another application. A database 
that is not created with a certificate of authenticity will fail to open if a certificate 
is supplied when a subsequent attempt to open it is made.  
ATCloseDatabase() should be called to close an open database. This function is 
called once the database is no longer required prior to termination of the 
application. 
The AWFS maintains the database in memory and automatically saves the 
database to disk at the end of any operation that modifies the content of the 
database. For example, the database is saved after enrollment, the writing of a 
user BLOB and insertion or deletion of data [30]. 
The AWFS provides a suite of extraction and matching algorithms. These 
algorithms are used within AWFS enrollment and matching (identification, 
validation and verification) functions. An application can be designed to use 
AWFS algorithms or it can use its own proprietary algorithms. In the latter case, 
AWFS is used for image acquisition only. 
Transactions:  
Enrollment, authentication and image acquisition are some of the high-level 
biometric operations. These operations involve reading and processing a series of 
images from the AuthenTec sensor. There might be a possibility for any other 
application to block the operations from another application. To prevent 
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blocking for the duration of the operation, the API for these operations is 
transaction oriented. Each transaction is initiated with an “ATBeginX” function, 
where “X” stands for the operation being started such as Enroll, AcquireImage, 
Verify, Validate, Identify.  
An application can receive events during a transaction by one of two methods: 
the application can receive messages synchronously by polling for new event 
messages or it can receive messages asynchronously by registering a callback 
function in the “ATBeginX” transaction function [30]. If the latter method is 
used the callback function is invoked whenever a new event message is available.  
Focus:  
When applications share the same sensor, at any given time only one application 
can receive images from the sensor. A loss of focus message ends the current 
transaction. All transaction message handlers should check for an 
AT_API_LOST_SENSOR_FOCUS message. The application that lost the 
sensor focus should not attempt to begin a new transaction until the window it is 
displaying gets the focus from Windows.  
Transaction Timeout:  
A timeout message message type AT_API_TIMEOUT is received by an 
application, , during a transaction if the AWFS is expecting to detect a finger on 
the sensor and no finger is detected after an extended period of time. A timeout 
message ends the current transaction. All transaction message handlers should 
check for an AT_API_TIMEOUT message.  
Transaction Event Messages:  
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The following event messages can be sent to the transaction event handler during 
an open transaction. The messages along with what they specify are given below. 
Information Messages:  
• AT_API_NEW_DISPLAY_IMAGE - A new image is available. This is used to 
update the real-time image display window.  
• AT_API_FINGER_DETECTED - A finger placement has been detected.  
• AT_API_FINGER_REMOVED - A finger removal has been detected.  
• AT_API_DATABASE_CHANGE - The opened shared database has been 
modified by another application. There is usually no action required of the 
application unless it is displaying database information, for example, a list of 
users.  
• AT_API_NO_CORE - The current finger placement does not contain a core (the 
center of the fingerprint pattern). This is usually caused by a poor finger 
placement. A good finger placement has the core in the center of the sensor.  
Prompt messages:  
• AT_API_LIFT_AND_REPLACE - The current transaction requires the user to lift 
his finger from the sensor and then place the same finger on the sensor.  
• AT_API_PLACE_FINGER - The current transaction requires the user to place a 
finger on the sensor.  
Transaction data ready messages:  
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• AT_API_ACQUIRE_DATA_RDY - The current acquire image transaction has the 
final data ready. The application should call ATEndAcquireImage() to receive the 
transaction results.  
• AT_API_ENROLL_DATA_RDY - The current enroll transaction has the final 
data ready. The application should call ATEndEnroll() to receive the transaction 
results.  
• AT_API_VALIDATE_DATA_RDY - The current validation transaction has the 
final data ready. The application should call ATEndValidateID() to receive the 
transaction results.  
• AT_API_VERIFY_DATA_RDY - The current verification transaction has the final 
data ready. The application should call ATEndVerify() to receive the transaction 
results.  
• AT_API_IDENTIFY_DATA_RDY - The current transaction has the final data 
ready. The application should call ATEndIdentify() to receive the transaction 
results.  
Transaction termination messages:  
• AT_API_TIMEOUT – The AWFS cancelled the current transaction due to a 
timeout. The AWFS was unable to obtain a good image.  
• AT_API_LOST_SENSOR_FOCUS – Another application sharing the same sensor 
has initiated a transaction. The current transaction for this application is 
terminated [30]. 
Cancelling a Transaction: 
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An application can cancel a transaction by calling ATAbortTransaction(). 
Building an AWFS System: 
Building an AWFS system require the include files and the libraries as given 
below: 
Header Files The required header files are as follows: 
GenTypes.h - Type definitions.  
ACAPIDef.h - Message defines, structure definitions, error codes and 
enumeration value ATStdAPITypes.h – AT structure definitions.  
ATInterface.h  - API functions header file 
 Link Files An application should link to dynamic library ATSC51.lib and load 
the ATSC51.dll at runtime 
Initialization An application must first initialize the AWFS system before calling 
any other API functions. In C, ATInit() is called to initialize the system. See the 
following code sample: 
 
 if ( AT_OK != ATInit()) 
 return -1; 
 
if ( AT_OK != ATOpenSensor(NULL, 
AT_SENSOR_OPEN_MODE_SHARED) )  
{  
MessageBox(NULL, “Failed to open a Fingerprint Sensor..\nExiting...",  
“System Error!", MB_OK);  
return -1;  
}  
// Close the sensor  
ATCloseSensor() ;  
// Close the system  
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ATClose(); 
API Functions  
Initialization  
ATInit()  
As mentioned above ATInit() function Initializes the AuthenTec system API. An 
application calls this function during initialization. Calling this function requires a 
corresponding call to ATClose() prior to application shutdown.  
AT_RESULT_CODE ATInit()  
Parameters  
None  
Returns  
AT_OK Initialization successful.  
 
ATCreate()  
This function initializes the AuthenTec system API. An application calls this 
function during initialization. Calling this function requires a corresponding call 
to ATClose() prior to application shutdown.  
AT_RESULT_CODE ATCreate()  
Parameters  
None  
Returns  
AT_OK Initialization successful.  
 
ATClose()  
This function Closes the AuthenTec sub-system that was initialized previously by 
calling the ATInit() or ATCreate() function.  
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AT_RESULT_CODE ATClose() 
Parameters  
None  
Returns  
AT_OK Termination successful.  
Convenience API: 
 
There are Transaction Begin/End functions such as ATBeginEnroll, 
ATEndEnroll, ATBeginValidate, ATEndValidate. The AWFS API refers to these 
functions in ATSC51.lib and ATAuthenticateLib.lib. A user application can be 
developed using these functions but there is no user interface support included in 
this API. The AWFS includes additional “convenience” support called 
convenience API to rapidly develop an AWFS application. This support includes 
user interfaces for performing the various biometric operations such as 
enrollment, identification, etc using functions such as ATEnroll, ATIdentify. 
These functions in the convenience API make use of the transaction Begin/End 
functions required to do the operations. The source code and header files for the 
convenience functions can be compiled and included into the application which 
invokes a desired biometric operation by calling a single high-level convenience 
function. Convenience functions display user interface items, such as text 
prompts and fingerprint images necessary to perform the requested biometric 
operation. The convenience source code makes calls into the AWFS API, and 
obtains feedback from the main AWFS API while carrying out the biometric 
operation. An application is blocked while a convenience function is in process. 
Only the final result of the operation is returned by the convenience function. An 
application developer can alter the appearance or behavior of the user interface 
by modifying the supplied source code. The various biometric operations, and the 
high-level API calls for the Convenience API are described below. 
High-Level Convenience Functions 
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ATConvenienceAPIInit() Initializes the Convenience API components.  
ATEnroll() Performs an enrollment of a finger. The resulting reference template 
can be placed into the AWFS proprietary database or exported from the function 
upon successful completion. Various windows and message boxes will 
automatically guide the user through the enrollment process.  
ATValidateFingers() Determines which, if any, external fingerprint template 
passed into the function matches the finger being placed on the sensor. Various 
windows and message boxes will automatically guide the user through the 
process.  
ATValidateID() Determines whether a template for the specified user ID stored 
in the AWFS database matches the finger being placed on the sensor. Various 
windows and message boxes will automatically guide the user through the 
process. 
ATIdentify()  
Determines which, if any, template stored in the AWFS database matches the 
finger being placed on the sensor. Various windows and message boxes will 
automatically guide the user through the process.  
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C h a p t e r  5  
IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation is one of the important aspects when considering a security 
application. The Authentication system implemented in this thesis uses three 
factor authentication to give access to many applications with out the need for 
the user to enter his or her user id and password for each of the applications. Any 
application can use this component to provide three factor authentication. There 
might be applications that already use password to authenticate the users. These 
applications can further augment their security by using this three factor 
authentication system. 
To use this system the user has to go through two phases Enroll phase and 
Authenticate phase. During the Enroll phase, the user is enrolled to the 
Authentication system using Java Ring, PIN and fingerprint. During enroll 
process a reference template of the user fingerprint is created. The user initially 
has to choose a user id and give his information such as first name, last name, 
phone no. etc. which are stored in the database. This database in this system is 
used to keep a record of the users using the authentication system and the user 
related information. 
During the Authenticate phase, the user gives his Java Ring, pin and the 
fingerprint. The system checks to see if the ring belongs to that particular user, 
then the system checks if the pin is valid and then the system matches the users 
fingerprint with the reference template obtained during the enroll process. Only if 
all the three factors are validated, the user is authenticated. Once the user is 
authenticated , he is given access to the application. 
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 Biometrics has proven to provide good authentication. But when using 
biometrics like a fingerprint, the question that arises is as to where to store the 
fingerprint. Fingerprint is vulnerable and if the fingerprint template is not stored 
in a secure place, it is possible that the fingerprint template can be tampered. 
When considering a basic application providing logical access to PC/Network 
logon using biometrics, storing the fingerprint at the local computer or server 
might be enough as the fingerprint represent the digital identity of the person in 
the local environment and not on the internet. If the scope is PKI based 
applications (such as VPN, secure email etc) where a smart card is used for 
credential storage, the fingerprint template should be stored in the smart card.  
It is important to choose the appropriate level of security for a system. There are 
different ways to implement biometrics. Two important aspects of biometric 
systems are  
• Storing (on a server, in the PC, in a smart card)  
• Matching (on a server, in the PC, in a smart card) 
The card in our case is the Java Card in the Java Ring, which is a type of smart 
card. Depending on how these parts are combined, the security implications of 
the system are different.  
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The table below shows combinations of where a fingerprint can be stored, and 
where it can be matched. Some of these combinations are highly unlikely to ever 
exist in a commercial product and are therefore not discussed and marked with 
an X. 
 Store on 
server 
Store on PC  Store on 
smart card 
Match on 
server 
              a              X                         b 
Match on PC               X               c                  d 
Match on 
smart card 
              X                X                  e  
Figure 4.4: Biometric data Stored/Matched [31] 
 (a) Match on server / Store on server 
In this case, during the enroll process a reference template is created and stored 
on the server in a database. During the verification process, the user’s fingerprint 
template (or match template) is sent to the server and the user’s template is 
matched with the reference template at the server and a result is sent back to the 
user.  
Matching on a server means matching the template in a protected environment. 
Using this system, the administrator can monitor the security and detect 
attempted attacks on the system. Hence the administrator has full control of the 
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fingerprint database. The storage on the servers means that also the template is 
protected from tampering, at least from the outside.  
The drawbacks of using this system are that, it violates personal integrity. Getting 
users to store their fingerprint templates in a server out of their control may be 
hard; this requires that the party running the server is trusted. One security 
problem is the transfer of the template from the capturing device to the server. 
This requires a secure internet session or an intelligent way to solve the problem 
with cryptography. This solution also requires that a new infrastructure is built, 
which makes the solution difficult to deploy in large scale. 
(b) Match on server / store on card 
In this case, the reference template obtained during enrollment, remains with the 
user on a smart card. During the verification process, the user’s fingerprint is sent 
to the server along with the reference template in the smart card. A matching of 
the user’s fingerprint template with the reference template takes place at the 
server and a result of the matching is sent back to the user.  
Using this kind of a system, the problem with storing ones fingerprint template 
on a server out of control is solved.  
This solution has drawbacks both with regards to security and due to the fact that 
a new infrastructure has to be built. The problem with servers - the transfer of 
information across an untrusted network is augmented; now both the template 
and the input image must be transferred. In this case some kind of strong 
encryption should be applied to secure the transfer. This might require a new 
infrastructure to be built. 
(c) Match on PC / Store on PC 
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This is a common combination where the templates are stored on the user’s hard 
drive. This is also where the matching takes place. The advantage of using this 
system is that the user has got control of his/hers own templates. 
Since the PC is not a secure device there is an immediate threat that secrets such 
as templates or passwords may be stolen or tampered with. Mobility may be a 
problem; the user can only log on to the computer where the template is stored. 
This solution is not even scalable on a local network.  
(d) Match in PC / store on smart card 
 In this case, the reference template is stored on the smart card and during the 
verification process; the user’s template is matched with the reference template 
on the PC.  
This solution eliminates some of the problems with Match on PC/Store on PC. 
The advantage using this kind of a system is that the user can carry his or her own 
template. When a smart card is used it is often access to the protected area on the 
card that is critical. Access is granted if the correct PIN is sent to the card. The 
PIN is matched on the card. In this system, both the template and the PIN have 
to be transferred to the PC from the card, if the input image matches the 
template the PIN is sent back to the smart card to gain access. The template is 
not available for hacking at all time since it is stored on a card. The user can use 
the fingerprint and the smart card for accessing multiple devices. 
The drawback of using this kind of a system is that the templates are exposed 
during verification process. The critical information (the template and the secret 
e.g. PIN) is sent to the PC from the card when matching. This means that both 
the template and the secret can be tampered with or stolen. This solution cannot 
be used for secure network transactions. 
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(e) Match on card / Store on card 
In this case the reference template is stored on the card and during the 
verification process, the user’s template is sent to the card and a matching takes 
place with the reference template and a result is sent back to the user. Using this 
kind of a solution the sensitive data (the template) never leaves the card. There is 
also no secret to steal since a successful match enables the use of certificates on 
the card without the need of stored PINs or passwords. Even in the unlikely 
event that a card is tampered with; only limited damage is done since only that 
specific users’ credentials are hacked. An attack on multiple users means that the 
attacker must get hold of all users' cards. This method is normally seen as the 
most secure way of biometrically securing computers, networks and digital 
information in general. 
The advantages of using this kind of a system are as follow: 
• The smart card is made personal; it cannot be accessed without the 
appropriate biometric authentication 
• The templates are never exposed to a non-tamper proof environment 
• The user carries his/hers own templates 
• The solution works with a PKI (digital signatures, authentication over 
networks, encryption) without the need of new infrastructure. 
From the cases discussed, we know that security wise, match on card/ store on 
card is one of the best ways of implementing a system. The Java Ring used in this 
thesis implementation, does not support the fingerprint matching API. A product 
named Precise BioMatch provides the fingerprint matching API. Using this API 
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we can match the template inside the card (Java Ring). But the API precise 
BioMatch provides is Java Card 2.1.2 compatible where as the iButton in the Java 
Ring is 2.0 compatible. So, it is not possible to match the fingerprint template 
inside the Java Card. Due to this reason, we are going to store the reference 
template in the card and match the template with the user’s fingerprint outside 
the card. So we are going to use the match on server/ store on card scenario 
discussed earlier. 
Java Ring used in this project has 6K memory. It uses most of its memory for 
loading the applet in the card. Since the memory left after loading the applet is 
not sufficient to store a fingerprint template, we have segmented the fingerprint 
template into two. One of the segments is stored in the Java Ring and the other 
segment is stored on the database. Java Ring and iButton are used synonymously 
through out the discussion of the implementation. 
The fingerprint API, AT API used in this project is in C and C++. To integrate 
the native methods in AT API with the other part of the system (which is 
implemented in Java), Java Native Interface (JNI) interface is used. 
The two phases, the Enroll phase and the Authenticate phase as mentioned 
earlier are implemented as two systems, Enroll and Authenticate systems 
respectively. In the next section we will discuss about Enroll system and 
Authenticate system. For each of the system we discuss the high level design, 
system use case, collaboration diagrams and the features of each system as to how 
they are implemented. The implementation of the application is shown in UML 
notation 
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5.1. Enroll system:  
Enrollment is a process where a user is initially enrolled into the system using, 
fingerprint, Java Ring and a pin. The figure below gives a high level design of the 
system. 
 
Figure 4.5: High level design of Enroll system 
      There are three subsystems involved in the enroll process, Java Ring 
subsystem, Fingerprint subsystem and Enroll server subsystem. The user sends 
an enroll request to the Enroll system GUI which is forwarded to the enroll 
server. The Enroll server sends requests to the Fingerprint subsystem to get the 
fingerprint template. The Fingerprint subsystem creates a fingerprint template for 
the user and sends the template as a response. The Enroll server next sends 
requests to store user information, the user application list, the user fingerprint 
template and the user pin to the Java Ring subsystem. The Java Ring subsystem 
stores the information of the user. The Enroll server sends requests to the 
database to store user Information, the user applications and the other part of the 
fingerprint template segment. The database stores all the required information of 
the user. Once all the information is stored, the iButton is locked. Locking the 
iButton is the last step in the enroll process. This is done my setting a flag. 
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5.1.1. Enroll User Use Case : 
Use Case name: Enroll User 
Summary: Customer is enrolled into the system to get access to application using 
a single sign on. 
Actor: Authentication system customer 
Precondition: System is idle with application Enroll and Authenticate option 
buttons on the screen. Administrator is available with the user for enrolling the 
user. 
Description:  
1. The customer clicks on the Enroll button. 
2. The system displays a user information form with the fields for user 
name, phone number and address. 
3. The user fills the form by entering his user name, phone number and 
address 
4. If the user phone number is valid, the system prompts the user to choose 
a User ID. 
5. If the User ID is not already enrolled for this user or any other user the 
system enrolls the user with the user id. 
6. The system prompts the user to place his finger on the fingerprint sensor. 
7. The user places his finger on the fingerprint sensor and follows the 
instructions for enrolling the fingerprint. 
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8. The system enrolls the user fingerprint. 
9. The system prompts the user to insert his Java Ring in the blue dot 
receptor. 
10. The user inserts his Java Ring in the blue dot receptor. 
11. The system checks to see if the Java Ring is already enrolled. 
12. If the Java Ring is not already enrolled, the system prompts the user to 
enter a User PIN (for the Java Ring). 
13. The user enters a User PIN. 
14. The system enrolls the Java Ring with the User PIN. 
15. The system locks the Java Ring to Enrolled mode. 
16. The system displays a message saying that the user is enrolled. 
 
Alternatives: 
• If the phone number is invalid and has less than or more than 10 digits, 
the system re-prompts the user to enter a valid phone number 
• If the user chosen User ID is already enrolled for another user, the user 
prompts the user to choose a different user ID. 
• If the user chosen User ID is already enrolled for this user, the system 
prompts if the user wants to re-enroll 
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• If the user selects the re-enroll option, the User ID is set as not enrolled 
and the user is enrolled again following steps from 1 to 16. 
• If the system does not detect a fingerprint on the sensor for a certain 
amount of time, the system displays a system out of time message. 
• If the system does not detect the user Java Ring in the blue dot receptor, 
the system displays a Java Ring not found error message. 
• If the Java Ring is already enrolled, the system displays a message saying 
the Ring is already enrolled with an option to re-enroll. 
• If the user selects a re-enroll option the system re-enrolls the Java Ring 
with the user chosen new User PIN 
Postcondition: Customer has been enrolled. 
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5.1.2. Collaboration Diagram: 
 
Figure 4.6: Collaboration diagram for Enroll User 
use case 
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5.1.3. Features of the Enroll system: 
• The Enroll system enroll the user using the Fingerprint, Java Ring and a 
User PIN 
• This system stores the application list that the user has to access to in the 
iButton. 
• The Enroll system uses Obsever-Observable design pattern extending 
java.util.Observable to notify the user of the events about the Java Ring. 
The Observers of this class can be notified of the card inserted and card 
removed events and also notify of messages (like Exceptions etc on 
cardInserted actions). The Java Card has a listener called CTListener to 
observe for any events such as a Java ring inserted or Java Ring removed 
event. The Enroll application observes these events and notifies the 
model which further notifies the GUI which notifies the user about the 
update events. The host observes the applet using CTListener for any 
events and if any events occur, the host notifies the model which further 
notifies the GUI of the events and updates. This GUI displays an 
appropriate message to the user such as the iButton is inserted or iButton 
is removed. 
• The Enroll system uses Model View Controller (MVC) design pattern. 
This design pattern clearly defines the boundaries between the user 
interface and business logic. Using this design pattern gives a good 
separation of modules and makes it clear and easy to understand. Model 
in this application deals with the data that need to be displayed and the 
operations that can be applied to transform the objects. The controller 
deals with updating a particular parameter in the model which has to be 
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displayed by the view. This is done in the action performed methods. The 
view deals with the GUI (presentation of the information to the user). 
• The Enroll system provides, enroll and re-enroll features. A user can re-
enroll with the same Java Ring again with out having to change his user 
id. The system uses the same user id to re-enroll the user.  
• The system is self aware of the mode and presents the GUI accordingly. 
The system keeps track of the present mode and goes to the next mode 
according to action taken in this mode. For example, consider the case 
where the system is in ‘insert’ mode, where the user information is 
inserted into the database and Java Ring. The system finds that the ring is 
already enrolled. In such a case, the system asks the user if he wants to re-
enroll. If the user chooses to re-enroll, the mode is automatically set to 
‘modify’, where only the information that has been modified is updated in 
the database and the ring. 
• The system uniquely handles exceptions and validations and displays the 
appropriate message to the user. 
• The system locks the iButton as a last step in the enroll process. The user 
is considered as enrolled only if the iButton is locked. Locking the 
iButton, locks all the administrative functions after initial setup. iButton 
once locked cannot be accessed by the user thus preventing any changes 
to be made by the user.  
• The application makes use of check pin function, which makes use of the 
Java Card Owner PIN API and iButton clock. This function checks to 
see if the PIN passed from the host (user PIN) matches the applet's 
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internal PIN. A host application has 5 tries to get the correct PIN.  If an 
incorrect PIN is supplied 5 times in a row, the PIN is blocked and cannot 
be used again (even with the correct PIN value) for a duration of 30 
minutes.  After this time period has elapsed, the host may once again 
attempt to send a correct PIN.  
• The application provides 3 attempts for entering a correct PIN. If the 
user does not enter a correct PIN in 3 attempts, he is not authenticated 
and hence not given access to the applications  
• The system provides the additional feature of giving administrator access 
to the Ring after locking the iButton. The administrator can access the 
iButton using an administrator PIN. This can be useful in cases where a 
user happens to forget his or her user PIN. Another example is where a 
user wants to re-enroll or change his information in the card; he can do 
so with the help of the administrator who has the administrator key. 
• The user fingerprint is uploaded into the applet in batches 128 bytes. The 
fingerprint segment cannot be sent in a single apdu due to constraints of 
Java One’98 release of iButton which limits the array index parameter to 
maximum number of bytes that can be sent. So, the fingerprint is sent 
iteratively in batches of 128 bytes. 
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5.2. Authenticate system: Once a user is enrolled, the user can access the 
applications he wants using the authentication process. The figure below gives a 
high level design of the authentication process. 
 
Figure 4.7: High level design of Authenticate 
system 
There are three subsystems involved in the authentication process. They are Java 
Ring subsystem, Fingerprint subsystem and the Authentication server subsystem. 
The user sends a request for authentication to the Authentication system GUI 
which is forwarded to the Authentication server subsystem. The Authentication 
server subsystem first checks to see if the iButton is locked. Only if the ibutton is 
locked, the user is considered enrolled. If the ibutton is not locked, the user is 
considered as not enrolled and hence not authenticated and not given access tot 
eh application. During the authentication process, the Authentication server 
subsystems request the Java Ring subsystem for information such as user pin, 
user information, user applications and fingerprint templates, and the Java Ring 
sends the corresponding information. The fingerprint template segment obtained 
from the Java Ring is the first segment of the fingerprint template. The 
Authentication server subsystem gets the second segment of the fingerprint 
template from the database. The Authentication server subsystem then sends a 
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request to Fingerprint subsystem to validate the user template. The Fingerprint 
subsystem validates the user reference template against the user fingerprint and 
sends a response to the Authentication server subsystem. If the fingerprint is 
validated, the user is authenticated and given access to his applications. 
5.2.1. Authenticate User Use Case: 
Use Case name: Authenticate User 
Summary: Customer is given access to the user applications using a single sign 
on. 
Actor: Authentication system customer 
Precondition: System is idle with application Enroll and Authenticate option 
buttons on the screen. 
Description:  
1. The customer clicks on the Authenticate button. 
2. The system prompts the user to enter his User ID. 
3. If the User ID is already enrolled, the system prompts the user to insert 
his Java Ring in the blue dot receptor. 
4. The user inserts his Java Ring in the blue dot receptor. 
5. The system checks to see if the Java Ring is already enrolled. 
6. If the Java Ring is already enrolled, the system prompts the user to enter 
his User PIN. 
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7. The user enters his User PIN. 
8. If the user entered User PIN is valid, the system prompts the user to 
place his finger on the fingerprint sensor. 
9. The user places his fingerprint on the fingerprint sensor. 
10. The System validates the fingerprint with the template. 
11. If the fingerprint is validated, the system displays a User Authenticated 
message along with the list of applications accessible to the user. 
12. The user selects the application he wants to access. 
Alternatives: 
• If the User ID is not already enrolled, the system displays an invalid User 
ID message. 
• If the system does not detect the Java Ring in the blue dot receptor, the 
system displays a Java Ring not found error message. 
• If the Java Ring is not already enrolled, the System displays a Java Ring 
not enrolled message 
• If the system does not detect a fingerprint on the sensor for a certain 
amount of time, the system displays a system out of time message. 
• If the user entered User PIN is invalid, the system re-prompt the user for 
a User PIN 
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• If the User PIN is invalid for three times, the system exits. 
Postcondition: The user is authenticated using single sign on and given access to 
all of the user applications. 
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5.2.2. Collaboration Diagrams: 
Figure 4.8: Collaboration diagram for Authenticate 
User use case 
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5.2.3. Features of Authenticate system: 
• The Authenticate system stores the fingerprint template on the card and 
matches the template on the host. 
• The Enroll system uses Obsever-Observable design pattern extending 
java.util.Observable to notify the user of the events about the Java Ring. 
The Observers of this class can be notified of the card inserted and card 
removed events and also notify of messages (like Exceptions etc on 
cardInserted actions). The Java Card has a listener called CTListener to 
observe for any events such as a Java ring inserted or Java Ring removed 
event. The Enroll application observes these events and notifies the 
model which further notifies the GUI which notifies the user about the 
update events. The host observes the applet using CTListener for any 
events and if any events occur, the host notifies the model which further 
notifies the GUI of the events and updates. This GUI displays an 
appropriate message to the user such as the iButton is inserted or iButton 
is removed. 
• The Authenticate system uses Model View Controller (MVC) design 
pattern which clearly defines the boundaries between the user interface 
and business logic. Model in this application deals with the data that need 
to be displayed and the operations that can be applied to transform the 
objects. The controller deals with updating a particular parameter in the 
model which has to be displayed by the view. The view deals with the 
GUI (presentation of the information to the user). 
• The Authentication system has a timeout feature. If the system does not 
detect a Java Ring or a fingerprint on the sensor with in a specified time, 
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the system exits with a time out message and the authentication of the 
user is failed. 
• The system provides 3 attempts for entering a correct PIN. If the user 
does not enter a correct PIN in 3 attempts, he is not authenticated and 
hence not given access to the applications. 
• The application makes use of check pin function, which makes use of the 
Java Card Owner PIN API and iButton clock. This function checks to 
see if the PIN passed from the host (user PIN) matches the applet's 
internal PIN. A host application has 5 tries to get the correct PIN.  If an 
incorrect PIN is supplied 5 times in a row, the PIN is blocked and cannot 
be used again (even with the correct PIN value) for a duration of 30 
minutes.  After this time period has elapsed, the host may once again 
attempt to send a correct PIN.  
• The Authentication system has a simplified usage and can be plugged into 
any application by instantiating an Authenticate object and calling 
Authenticate and user name as parameters. This feature makes it ideal to 
be used as an API. An application can use the Authenticate application by 
passing the user id. 
• When an application calls Authenticate object, the application and the 
GUI for the Authenticate system run in two different threads. Calling an 
instance of Authenticate immediately starts GUI. Since application and 
the GUI run in two different threads, the thread for the calling 
application is stopped and the GUI thread is started. Once the 
Authentication system authenticates the user, the control is given to the 
application thread. The Authentication system returns the user id if the 
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user is authenticated. If the user is not authenticated, it throws an 
exception. The calling program gives access to the user, depending on 
what the Authenticate system returns. If the Authentication system 
returns user id, the user is authenticated and hence can access the 
application. 
• The Authenticate system retrieves the fingerprint from the iButton in 
batches of 128 bytes. 
• The system uniquely handles exceptions and validations and displays the 
appropriate message to the user. 
                                   
5.3. System Initialization: 
When the Authentication system is initialized, it performs the following 
functions: 
• Sets  the Database Connection 
• Checks if fingerprint sensor is available 
• Checks if the blue dot receptor is available 
• Instantiates a Java Ring host 
• Initializes the ATApi (fingerprint API).  
If system fails to perform any one of the above initialization functions, it gives a 
fatal exception message and shuts down.  
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5.4. iButton Implementation: 
The BioSecureAuthenticate_Applet is the applet in the iButton. There are two 
hosts, enroll host and authenticate host.  In this application, enroll host is the 
BioSecureEnroll_Host and authenticate host is the BioSecureAuthenticate_Host. 
When an iButton is inserted, the enroll host and the authenticate host check to 
see if the applet is loaded in the iButton. The enroll host loads an applet, if an 
applet not already loaded in the iButton during the enroll process. The 
authenticate host gives an error message if an applet is not already loaded during 
the authentication process. 
During the enroll process, the host communicates with the applet using a set of 
commands. The figure below shows the commands sent from the host to the 
applet during enroll process. 
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Figure 4.9: Communication between host and 
applet during Enroll process 
If the host finds that an applet is already loaded in the iButton with the given user 
information, it asks the user if he or she wants to re-enroll. If the user accepts to 
re-enroll, BioSecureEnroll_host sends a delete applet by ID request to the 
BioSecureAuthenticate_Applet to delete the already existing applet in the iButton.  
Master Erase Applet is an optional command and is sent only in cases where 
there are no other applets (used by other applications) co-existing with the 
BioSecureAuthenticate_Applet in the iButton. Master Erase Applet option erases 
all the applets installed on the iButton, frees all memory created by these applets, 
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and reset all configuration options back to default values. (i.e., set AppletGC to 
off, etc.). 
Load applet command is sent to the applet when the host does not detect a user 
information applet in the iButton. The host sends the Load applet command 
after sending a Delete Applet by ID command or a Master Erase command to 
load an applet.  
Setting the Ephemeral GC mode, the ephemeral collector in the applet recovers 
data that was referenced for a short period and been out of scope (local variables, 
objects whose references are never stored in reference fields, etc). 
Setting the Applet GC mode, applet collector recovers data that was referenced 
by the fields of an applet. These references are instantiated and then the 
references are lost either by setting the field to null or by instantiating another 
block of data. 
Set User Information sets the user given information - user id, user name, 
phone number and address in the applet. 
Set User Application Access List sets the user application list along with their 
corresponding user name and passwords for each application in the applet. 
Set Fingerprint Template Segment sets the fingerprint template segment for 
the user in the applet. 
Set User PIN sets the user pin for the user in the iButton. The user can access 
the iButton using this user pin when the user wants to get access to his 
applications. 
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The last part of the enrolling processing is to lock the iButton. This is done after 
setting the user pin. Locking the iButton is to let the application know that the 
user has been enrolled. If the user quits before finishing the enroll process, in 
such a case, iButton is not locked and hence the application knows the user is not 
enrolled. The communication between the BioSecureAuthenticate_Host and 
BioSecureAuthenticate_Applet is as shown below. 
 
Figure 4.10: Communication between host and 
applet during the Authentication process 
During the Authentication process, the applet checks if the applet is loaded using 
the Is Applet Loaded command. If the applet is already loaded, applet sends a 
response indicating that the applet is loaded. If the applet is not loaded, it sends a 
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response indicating that the applet is not loaded. In cases where the applet is not 
loaded, system throws an exception giving an error message stating that the user 
is not enrolled. 
The applet next checks if the iButton is locked using is iButton locked 
command. If the host receives an iButton locked response, it proceeds to the 
other commands. If the host receives an iButton unlocked response, it sends an 
error message stating that the user is not enrolled. 
Once the host makes sure that the applet is loaded and the iButton is locked, the 
host gets the user information from the applet using the Get User Information 
command. The user pin is send as a parameter to check if the user is the right 
user. The applet returns the user id, phone number and address as the response 
to this command. 
Get Fingerprint Template Segment command is send with the user pin as a 
parameter to get the user template segment as a response from the applet. 
Get User Application access List command is send with the user pin as a 
parameter to get the user application list as a response. 
As mentioned in chapter 5, the host and the applet communicate using APDU 
commands and responses. A command APDU has CLA (the applet name), INS 
(method being called), p1 & p2 (additional control data), DATA (data to be sent) 
and Le (length of the data) as its parameters.  
The applet sets the CLA of the applet as shown below 
public static final byte BIOSECURITYENROLL_CLA = (byte)0x80; 
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Each method in the applet is given a number as shown below to be represented 
as 1 byte. 
   // Main Functionality 
   public static final byte BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_SETUSERINFO = 
(byte)0; 
   public static final byte BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_GETUSERINFO = 
(byte)1; 
…….. 
…….. 
 
The install method in the applet is overridden by calling the constructor as 
follows. 
 
public static void install(APDU apdu) 
    { 
        new BioSecureAuthenticate_Applet(); 
    } 
 
The first thing the process method does is to check whether CLA in the 
command APDU received matches the CLA of the applet. 
 
        //Determine if the applet is being selected. 
        if((buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] == SELECT_CLA) && 
           (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS] == SELECT_INS)) 
        { 
            //*********************************** 
            //* Add any code to be executed on * 
            //* applet selection here.          * 
            //*********************************** 
 
            return; 
          } 
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The process method would perform the appropriate instruction by doing a switch 
on the INS field of the apdu, calling the appropriate method. 
 
switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) 
            { 
                case BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_SETUSERINFO: 
setUserInfo_Dispatch(apdu, buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P1],    
buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P2]); 
break; 
 
                case BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_GETUSERINFO: 
getUserInfo_Dispatch(apdu, buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P1], 
buffer[ISO.OFFSET_P2]); 
break; 
 
….. 
   
                default: 
 ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
            } 
 
In the host application the sendAPDU method  
sendAPDU(int CLA, int INS, int P1, int P2, byte[] Data, int Le) is overridden 
with the  
sendAPDU(int CLA, int INS, int P1, int P2, byte[] Data, SlotChannel sc) method. 
The SlotChannel sc here is the connection through which the apdu is be sent.  
All the methods in the host application use the sendAPDU method with slot 
channel as one of its parameters. After executing all the methods, the host runs 
the finalize method which closes all the open slot channels. 
 96
The next part of this section discusses about the CLA, INS, p1 & p2, Data and 
Le values for each of the methods in the BioSecureEnroll_Host and 
BioSecureAuthenticate_Host. 
BioSecureEnroll_Host methods: 
CLA value is the same for all methods since we are sending the apdu to the same 
applet. The length Le is different for each method and is equal to the length of 
the data. For any method, the data is always appended with the length of the user, 
user pin and the length of the actual data to be sent. 
CLA: 0x80 
INS: (byte)0 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_SETUSERINFO) 
p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: byte array with user first name, last name and phone number. 
p1: 0x01 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: byte array with user address. 
 
INS: (byte)2 
(BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_SETFINGERPRINTSEGMENT) 
p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: Since the whole template segment cannot be send in a single apdu, 
the template segment is divided and send in blocks of 128 byte, which is 
the APDU packet length. When p1 and p2 have a value of 0x0, it 
indicates that the block being sent is the first block of the template 
segment. 
p1: 0x01 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: when p1 has a value of 0x01, it indicates that the block being sent is 
a second, third, last or any other block. It indicates that it is not a first 
block. 
 
INS: (byte)7 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_SETUSERPIN) 
p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user pin as a byte array. 
 
INS: (byte)5 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_SETAPPLIST) 
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p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user application list as a byte array. 
 
INS: (byte)9 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_LOCKBUTTON) 
p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user pin that has to be locked as a byte array. 
 
INS: (byte)1 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_GETUSERID) 
 p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user pin as a byte array. 
 
The response apdu for this method would have the user ID as its Data and the status words. 
 
BioSecureAuthenticate_Host methods: 
CLA: 0x80 
INS: (byte)1 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_GETUSERINFO) 
p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user pin as a byte array. If p1 and p2 are 0x00, it indicates that the 
applet must send the user first name, last name and phone number as a 
response. 
Response APDU: 
 Data: user first name, last name and phone number 
p1: 0x01 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user pin as a byte array. If p1 has a value of 0x01 and p2 0x00, it 
indicates that the applet must send the user address as a response. 
Response APDU: 
 Data: user address 
 
INS: (byte)3 
(BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_GETFINGERPRINTTEMPLATESIZE) 
 p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: When p1 and p2 have a value of 0x0, it indicates that the applet 
must send the first block of the fingerprint segment. 
Response APDU: 
 Data: first block of the template segment 
 p1: 0x01 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: when p1 has a value of 0x01, and p2 0x00, it indicates the 
applet to send the next fingerprint segment block (which is not the 
first block). The data also has the start index and end index of the 
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segment that is sent as the block. Using these two indices, a block of 
the fingerprint is made and sent. 
Response APDU: 
 Data: It has the second, third, last or any other block other than the 
first block of the template segment 
 
INS: (byte)1 (BIOSECURITYENROLL_INS_GETAPPLIST) 
p1: 0x00 & p2: 0x00 
 Data: user pin as a byte array 
Response APDU: 
 Data: the user application list 
 
All the response apdu’s have a status word along with the reponse data to indicate 
the status of the operation. For example a status word of 0x9000 indicates a 
successful execution with out errors. 
5.5. Fingerprint Implementation: 
The application first initializes the fingerprint API during the initialization of the 
enroll process. When fingerprint API is initialized, the fingerprint database is 
initialized. AT API is used to initialize, enroll, identify and validate a user. During 
an enroll process, a fingerprint template is created for a user. This template is 
passed to the application controller which then segments the template into two 
and stores one of the segments in the Java Ring and the other in the database. 
During the authentication process, the application controller combines the two 
template segments and passes the complete template to the AT API for 
validation. The AT API then obtains a user fingerprint and matches it against the 
application fingerprint template. If a match is found, the user is validated, if not 
the user is not validated. If a user is not validated, he or she is not authenticated 
and hence not given access to the applications. If a user is validate he or she is 
given access to the applications. 
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The AT API for the fingerprint is in C and C++. The native methods are called 
from the Java implementation part of the application by creating dynamic 
libraries (dll). 
The following are the native functions used by the Java implementation part of 
the application. 
N_ATInitialize(String pDatabaseFileName, int pHwnd) 
This method calls the native function which initializes the fingerprint database. 
The database is usually stored as a file. This file name along with a window handle 
is sent. The window handle is used to display the fingerprint while enrolling, 
identifying or validating the user. The native function in C calls the function 
ATInit() to initialize the database as shown below. 
lDatabaseFilename = (TCHAR*)pEnv->GetStringUTFChars(pDatabaseFileName, 
&isCopy); 
// Initialize the AT control DLL. 
ATInit(); 
// Open up a database for this application to use 
iFLResult = ATOpenDatabase( lDatabaseFilename, 
AT_DATABASE_ACCESS_SHARE,                     
100000, NULL, 0); 
return iFLResult; 
 
N_ATIdentify() 
This method calls the native function to identify a fingerprint template which 
returns the user id (String) as a return value. Identification is process where, the 
application matches the user fingerprint against the enrolled fingerprint templates 
in the database. This native function calls a function ATIdentify() with user id as 
its parameter as shown below. 
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iFLResult = ATIdentify( (PTCHAR)lUserId ); 
return pEnv->NewStringUTF(lUserId); 
 
N_ATEnroll(String pUserId) 
This method calls the native function to enroll a user. User id is given as an input 
parameter to the native method and an integer representing the result code is 
returned. This integer can be decoded and an appropriate message is given to the 
user. The native function calls the function ATEnroll(). The native function first 
allocates some memory for the fingerprint template before calling the ATEnroll() 
as shown below. 
  
lUserId = (PTCHAR)pEnv->GetStringUTFChars(pUserId, &isCopy); 
if ((iFLResult = ATEnroll(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &iEnrollMaxStructSize )) == 
AT_OK) 
{ 
iFLResult = ATEnroll( lUserId, 0,  m_pTemplateStorage, 
iEnrollMaxStructSize, &iEnrollResultStructSize ); 
 if ( iFLResult != AT_OK ) 
 { 
 m_pTemplateStorage = NULL; 
 } 
} 
pEnv->ReleaseStringUTFChars(pUserId, (char*)lUserId); 
return iFLResult; 
 
 
getATTemplate(String pUserId) 
This method calls the native function to get a template for a particular user id. 
The template is returned as a byte array. The native function gets a pointer to the 
enrolled template and returns the template as shown below. 
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PTCHAR lUserId; 
jboolean isCopy; 
AT_RESULT_CODE iFLResult; 
jbyteArray jb; 
lUserId = (PTCHAR)pEnv->GetStringUTFChars(pUserId, &isCopy); 
jb = pEnv->NewByteArray(iEnrollResultStructSize); 
pEnv->SetByteArrayRegion(jb, 0, iEnrollResultStructSize, (jbyte*) 
m_pTemplateStorage); 
pEnv->ReleaseStringUTFChars(pUserId, (char*)lUserId); 
return (jb); 
 
N_ATValidate(String pUserId) 
This method calls the native function which validates a fingerprint against the 
templates available in the database file. The native function calls the function 
ATValidateID() , which takes in a user id as an input as shown below.  
lUserId = (PTCHAR)pEnv->GetStringUTFChars(pUserId, &isCopy); 
iFLResult = ATValidateID( lUserId ); 
pEnv->ReleaseStringUTFChars(pUserId, (char*)lUserId); 
return iFLResult; 
 
N_ATValidateFinger(byte[] pTemplate) 
This method calls the native function to validate a fingerprint against another 
specific template passed to it as an input byte array. The function returns the 
result code which is an integer. The user fingerprint is obtained from the user 
from the window handle. It uses the ATValidateFingers function to validate the 
fingerprint against the fingerprint template as shown below. 
lTemplate = pEnv->GetByteArrayElements(pTemplate, 0); 
if ( pTemplate == NULL ) { 
 iFLResult = AT_BAD_POINTER;  
} else { 
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 iFLResult = ATValidateFingers( (void *)lTemplate ); 
} 
pEnv->ReleaseByteArrayElements(pTemplate, lTemplate, 0); 
return iFLResult;  
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C h a p t e r  6  
CONCLUSION 
The Authenticate system uses three-factor authentication to authenticate a user. 
This makes the system more secure than one factor or two factor authentications. 
For this thesis, we developed the three-factor authentication system with Java 
Ring, Biometrics and a pin. We were able to demonstrate its usage by securing 
some applications including the Enroll application. Using the Authentication 
system for the Enroll application, only the authenticated users are given access to 
the Enroll application. This Authentication system has many security features. 
It uses Java Ring with an iButton which is Java Card 2.0 compliant. Java Card is a 
kind of smart card. Smart cards have always been considered very secure way of 
storing information. Java Ring with the iButton can overcome the deficiencies of 
the secret passwords. In order to gain access to the iButton, the user has to know 
the pin. The iButton’s zeroization capability erases the fingerprint template than 
reveal it to anyone. 
The National Institute of Standards (NIST) and the Communications security 
Establishment (CSE) have validated a version of the crypto iButton for 
protection of sensitive, unclassified information. 
The fingerprint sensor used in this application uses TruePrint technology. Using 
this technology makes it difficult for an imposter to fool the sensor with 
techniques such as gummy finger, thus making it less vulnerable. One of the most 
important issues of storing the fingerprint is solved in this application. The 
fingerprint template is stored in the Java Ring. The advantages of using this 
system are that the user can carry his or her own template (stored in the smart 
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card) and the user might use the fingerprint/smart card for accessing multiple 
devices. It allows individuals to control the access themselves - thus rendering 
individuals no longer impotent to the vulnerability of computers, databases and 
software or to accidents, malfunction or intrusion. 
With this three factor authentication, even if a hacker gets the pin, he cannot gain 
access to the application as he has to go through the process of fingerprint 
validation. 
The iButton is locked once enrolled, not allowing any one to see or change the 
information in the Java Ring. If the Ring is stolen, the hacker cannot access it 
because he has to unlock the iButton to access any of its resources. Unlocking an 
iButton can be done only by the administrator. 
The application uses check pin function, one of the features of iButton. This 
function gives the additional security of blocking the iButton for a certain period 
of time. If an incorrect PIN is supplied 5 times in a row, the PIN is blocked and 
cannot be used again, even with the correct PIN value for duration of 30 
minutes.  
The application provides 3 attempts for entering a correct PIN. If the user does 
not enter a correct PIN in 3 attempts, he is not authenticated and hence not given 
access to the applications.  
In this application, the fingerprint template is segmented into two and each of the 
segments is stored in a different place. This makes it more difficult for the hacker 
to get the complete template because he has to get the template from different 
places. 
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The Authentication system can be integrated in many ways. These are discussed 
in future work. 
Three factor authentication is one of the good ways of authenticating a user. 
Three factor authentication can be done using other physical devices and 
biometrics. The biometrics may include any thing such as scanning the iris, face 
recognition etc. Using three factor authentication and implementing a system by 
considering all the security issues makes a system more secure. 
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C h a p t e r  7  
FUTURE WORK 
The Authentication system can be integrated further in many ways. Given below 
are some of the future works that can be done on the system. 
Hand Shaking: 
It is good to have a handshaking between the host and the applet before the host 
gives any commands to the applet. In the handshaking process, host application 
(or terminal) must authenticate the applet before sending any messages to it and 
the applet also must authenticate the host. 
Encrypting the communication: 
If the communication between the host and the applet is encrypted, it can 
prevent the hackers from hacking any information between the host and the 
applet. 
iButton as a Single Sign-On (SSO) resource with authorization: 
The iButton can be made as a SSO resource by saving the applications that the 
user can access along with the applet pin and application access List in the 
iButton. The user name and password for each application is saved in the iButton 
and once the user is authenticated using three factor authentication, he or she is 
automatically logged in to the application. 
The application authorization features of the user can also be stored in the 
iButton. These authorization features specify the user’s actual roles in the 
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application such as employee, department head etc. The application downloads 
the authorization information and gives access to the user according to the access 
privilege set for the role 
Store the whole Fingerprint Template: 
In the Authentication system, the complete template cannot be stored in the 
iButton due to memory limitations. There are iButton available with more 
memory. Using an iButton with more memory allows storage of the whole 
fingerprint template in the iButton. 
Store usage statistics: 
iButton can be further used to store usage information statistics such as the time 
when a particular application was accessed, last time the database was accessed 
using iButton, the time when a particular transaction took place etc for securing 
financial transactions, point-of-sale transactions. Storing this kind of information 
can be useful for the administrator as well as the user. A user can keep a record of 
his or her transactions and activities. It can help the administrator to keep track of 
the user’s actions.  
Store application Level information: 
iButton can be used to store application level information which can be 
application related information such as encryption key or decryption key to gain 
access to an internet application or a database resource. 
Match on Card: 
The iButton used in the Authentication system is Java Card 2.0 compliant. A 
product named precise BioMatch, provides API to match a fingerprint inside the 
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Java Card. But the BioMatch API is Java Card 2.1.2 compliant. This is one of the 
reasons why iButton in this thesis could not match the fingerprint on the card. 
Using an iButton which is Java Card 2.1.2, we can match the fingerprint in the 
card using the precise BioMatch API thus upgrading the system further to Match 
on Card/Store on Card system, which is considered the most secure way of 
implementing a three factor authentication system with fingerprints as the 
biometrics. 
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